Resistance Lawyering by Farbman, Daniel S.
Boston College Law School 
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School 
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 
12-1-2019 
Resistance Lawyering 
Daniel S. Farbman 
Boston College Law School, farbman@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race 
Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel S. Farbman. "Resistance Lawyering." California Law Review 107, no.6 (2019): 1877-1953. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
 1877 
Resistance Lawyering 
Daniel Farbman* 
This is the story of a group of abolitionist lawyers who devoted 
themselves to working within a legal system that they considered to be 
fundamentally unjust and illegitimate. These “resistance lawyers” 
used the limited and unfriendly procedural tools of the hated Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850 to frustrate, oppose, and, if possible, dismantle the 
operation of that law. Abolitionist resistance lawyers were forthrightly 
committed both to ensuring that their clients remained free and to 
using the cases that arose under the Fugitive Slave Law to wage a 
proxy war against the institution of slavery. Their daily direct service 
practices were inextricably linked to their movement politics and 
aspirations for systemic reform. Using new archival research that 
upends the existing historical consensus, I show that this linked 
practice was dramatically more effective than previously thought, both 
in protecting individual clients and as a means of building political 
opposition to slavery in local and national politics. This history should 
serve as a provocation for contemporary resistance lawyering. Many 
lawyers today practice within a legal system that they oppose in the 
hope of frustrating or dismantling that system. I suggest that today’s 
resistance lawyers can learn from the abolitionists’ integration of 
politics and daily practice as they fight to increase the political power 
and salience of their own work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Like most abolitionist lawyers, John Joliffe thought that the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850 was a moral atrocity. That infamous law had been explicitly 
designed to create a summary process that would help Southern slave owners 
repossess human beings that they claimed as their slaves. Both the substance and 
the procedure of the Law were so anathema to abolitionists that antislavery 
activists like Jolliffe did not consider it worthy of respect or obedience. Living 
in Cincinnati, Ohio, just across the Ohio river from Kentucky, Jolliffe was 
stationed at one of the most active border crossings for the human beings who 
risked their lives to flee slavery.1 The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was written 
 
 1. The terminology around slavery is complex and highly debated. See Lucy Ferriss, The 
Language of Enslavement, LINGUA FRANCA (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/linguafranca/2017/10/12/the-language-of-enslavement 
[https://perma.cc/6L5S-F43F]. In this Article I have chosen to refer to the system and institution as 
“slavery” and to refer to a general class of people who were enslaved as “slaves.” When speaking about 
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expressly to ensure that those people who had risked their lives to come north 
would be arrested and sent back south to slavery with as little process and public 
outcry as possible. 
So when Jolliffe took the case of a man named Lewis in the fall of 1853, he 
was lawyering not to legitimize the law, but to kill it. From his first moment on 
the job, Jolliffe sought to throw sand into the works of the procedures set out 
under the law. Jolliffe had the federal officials holding Lewis arrested; sought 
every continuance and delay in the courtroom that he could get; and tried to get 
the state courts to step in and interrupt the federal process.2 He made the most of 
the limited tools available to him under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to 
dismantle that law from within. 
On the day that the commissioner was supposed to decide his fate, Lewis 
slipped out of the packed courtroom unnoticed and escaped into a friendly crowd 
of antislavery onlookers. From there, dressed as a woman and hiding in a series 
of safe houses, he eluded the grasp of his former master and made his way to 
freedom in Canada. Lewis’ escape was an act of bravery largely made possible 
by the support of a strong and organized local abolitionist movement. It was also 
made possible by the work of his lawyer. 
Lewis was among a surprisingly large number of alleged fugitive slaves 
who, despite having been caught in the grasp of one of the most infamously 
draconian laws in American history, escaped that grasp into freedom. Scholars 
have long told the story of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as a total tragedy 
where nearly every alleged fugitive caught in the web of the Law was doomed 
to be returned to slavery. My research reveals that we have this story at least 
partially wrong. Nearly four out of every ten people who were caught in the 
Law’s process ended up free. No one simple summary is adequate to explain this 
surprising outcome. 
The stories of these alleged fugitive slaves are complex, and the people 
most responsible for the successes were undoubtedly the alleged fugitives 
themselves, followed closely in importance by the (usually black) movement 
 
these people in any more particularized way, I will refer to them not as slaves but as people who were 
enslaved. In addition, when referring to those people who were caught up in the process of the 1850 
Law, I will refer to them as “alleged fugitive slaves.” These choices are far from perfect, but seek to 
balance two conflicting truths about doing history in this period. First, slavery existed and was a 
fundamental part of American life for more than two centuries. Human beings were bought and sold as 
property and understood in private and public discourse as slaves. In our commitment to recover the 
agency of those human beings, we should not elide the depth and width of the social, political, and legal 
force of the label “slave.” Still, as totalizing as slavery was in the past, historians also have an obligation 
to translate past into present. The human beings at the heart of this story (and of all stories about slavery) 
cannot and should not be reduced to a label that bears the stigma of oppression. Claims to ownership 
were contested in ways small and large, and the agency of enslaved people was a powerful force in the 
politics of the nation. Whether these terminological choices adequately balance the competing concerns 
laid out in this note, I am not sure. Those of us writing about these lives bear the responsibility, at a 
minimum, to grapple with these questions. 
 2. See infra, Part II.B.1.b. 
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activists who fought tirelessly for their freedom.3 What is more surprising is a 
third leading explanation: lawyers. Close attention to the stories of the daily legal 
struggle within the procedural framework of the 1850 Law reveals case after case 
where the work of lawyers was instrumental to the effort for freedom. 
The lawyers’ work that I discuss was not, for the most part, traditional 
lawyering. While they nearly always agreed on the merits that their client should 
be freed, what stands out in case after case is the extent to which these lawyers 
employed every means at their disposal to frustrate, delay, and dismantle the 
system within which they were practicing. This is what makes Jolliffe and other 
abolitionist lawyers fighting the 1850 Law models for what I am defining in this 
Article as “resistance lawyers.” 
A resistance lawyer engages in a regular, direct service practice within a 
procedural and substantive legal regime that she considers unjust and 
illegitimate. Through that practice, she seeks both to mitigate the worst injustices 
of that system and to resist, obstruct, and dismantle the system itself.4 The 
abolitionist lawyers of the 1850s are perfect archetypes of resistance lawyering 
because every alleged fugitive slave that they represented was caught up in the 
processes of the 1850 Law. Lawyers who argued that the system was an 
abomination had little choice but to use the tools of that system as part of their 
struggle against it. 
Resistance lawyering is rooted in direct service within the hostile system 
rather than collateral attack against it through other systems. Although 
abolitionist lawyers were not shy about challenging the constitutionality of the 
Law through processes external to the Law,5 it was their work against the Law 
from within its own procedural framework that was most legally and politically 
effective. Although they were happy to use the strategies of impact litigation and 
collateral attack when they were useful, the work of these lawyers looked more 
 
 3. Manisha Sinha’s magisterial recent work on the abolition movement proves this assertion 
with unanswerable force. MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION (2016). 
 4. As I discuss more fully below, I understand resistance lawyering to be a relative definition 
rather than an absolute one. Resistance lawyering describes an attitude toward a set of procedures rather 
than any fixed political commitment. Any time a lawyer practices within a procedural and/or substantive 
legal system (or sub-system) she opposes in order to defeat the operation of that system, that is resistance 
lawyering. The word “system” as I use it here does not mean “the law” broadly. Rather, it means a 
discrete legal system like the Fugitive Slave Law, capital punishment, bankruptcy, etc. Lawyers within 
a single movement may disagree about which systems are or are not legitimate and thus about which 
systems should be resisted and which should be fixed and protected. 
 5. Because of the procedural framework of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, there were 
relatively few vehicles for attacking the constitutionality of the Law separate from the direct adjudication 
of whether or not an alleged fugitive should be freed. There was no explicit appellate procedure under 
the Law and thus no obvious forum for carefully teed up legal challenges. That said, in case after case, 
lawyers made constitutional arguments against the Law as part of their direct defense of their clients. 
See, e.g., Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 337 (D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583). 
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often like direct service engaged in the urgent triage work of protecting human 
beings from being sent back into slavery.6 
This observation is important because today, providing triage and direct 
service is generally not seen as the most direct way to achieve broad systemic 
reforms. By definition, triage practices concern symptoms of deep and 
intractable social problems, and a triage lawyer’s job is usually to treat the 
symptoms rather than the central malaise. Both in law schools and in practice, 
there is a common anxiety that one must choose between “systemic” work and 
hands-on direct service work. The model of abolitionist resistance lawyers 
suggests that this need not be an either/or choice. The success of their strategies 
both for their clients and for the movement as a whole can serve as a spur and a 
lesson for present-day resistance lawyers who are confronting the question of 
how to make connections between their own movement politics and their daily 
practice. 
Although I follow resistance lawyering into the present, this Article is 
primarily a legal history of the lawyering strategies brought to bear against the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 by a set of abolitionist lawyers committed to 
undermining that law. In order to understand those strategies, it is necessary to 
put their practice into context. In Part I, I argue that these lawyers were not, and 
did not think they were, dismantling the institution of slavery in the courtroom. 
They knew slavery was a dominant social and cultural force that structured the 
underlying logics and mechanics of American law and politics. Although slavery 
was visible and manifest in legal rules and legal institutions, few held out hope 
that the institution of slavery itself could be directly assailed in a courtroom.7 
 
 6. I use the word triage here in a somewhat different sense than some authors discussing public 
interest lawyering and legal services. The term is often adapted from its medical usage to refer to the 
difficult choices that lawyers and advocates must make between which cases to take and which not to 
take. Paul Tremblay, for example, defines triage as “a practice of distinguishing among several clients 
in determining which should receive what level of service, acknowledging that each cannot receive an 
unlimited delivery of service.” Paul Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services 
Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1990). Anthony Alfieri expands this idea of triage to the level 
of community needs, arguing that those running nonprofits and clinics must also engage in a kind of 
decisional triage when deciding where and how to allocate time and resources. Anthony Alfieri, Inner-
City Anti-Poverty Campaigns, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1374, 1383 (2017). My own usage of the term in this 
article goes still one level of generality higher. Triage for me refers to the direct service lawyer’s position 
in relation to her clients. She takes in those with the symptoms created by the broader political and social 
problems as an emergency room takes in all comers. Of course, within that process, there is a need to 
distinguish between those who need attention urgently and those who do not. Independent of that hard 
call, however, is the fact that the purpose of direct representation is to address the symptoms that walk 
in the door rather than the diseases that may be causing them within the political culture. 
 7. This statement risks flattening the complex strategic debates that raged between abolitionist 
lawyers in the United States between the founding and the Civil War. Some more moderate lawyers 
(exemplified by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society in the 1820s and ‘30s) espoused an incrementalist 
strategy that proposed to challenge slavery in court wherever possible, limiting the practice as much as 
feasible through “legitimate” legal means in order to constrain and, they hoped, choke off the air to the 
institution of slavery. See RICHARD S. NEWMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: 
FIGHTING SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 60–85 (2002). Others, like William Lloyd Garrison and 
the New England Anti-Slavery Society, advocated a more radical immediatist position that relied less 
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These lawyers understood that the fight against slavery was a broad political 
effort to be waged across the culture. This did not mean that lawyers abandoned 
the courts as a site of resistance or that they shied away from direct 
representation. Rather, abolitionist lawyers saw what slavery cases did arise as 
opportunities, using every case arising under the 1850 Law as a venue for a 
vigorous rhetorical proxy battle against slavery. 
In Part II, I draw on my own novel archival research to show that the 
lawyers and activists behind these cases were more effective than historians have 
previously understood. One might assume that lawyers preoccupied with a 
rhetorical fight against an intractable social ill might be less effective in the 
defense of the human clients before them. In fact, until now, historians have 
generally concluded that, with or without lawyers, people unfortunate enough to 
be caught up in the process of the 1850 Law were overwhelmingly likely to be 
sent back to slavery. In fact, the research that I lay out in Part II challenges this 
conclusion by taking a fresh look at original archival information. After 
compiling a list of every known case arising under the 1850 Law, I sought to 
determine the outcome of each case and examine the role that a lawyer (if any 
was involved) played in reaching that outcome. 
Building on my surprising quantitative conclusions (nearly four out of ten 
alleged fugitives ending up free), Part II.B delves deeply into the narrative stories 
of a few select cases to explore what made abolitionist resistance lawyering so 
successful. Abolitionist resistance lawyers fought the 1850 Law from within, 
seeking delay at every turn, taking every opportunity to create procedural 
confusion and jurisdictional conflict, and remaining alert to any intervening 
event (legal or non-legal) that they could opportunistically seize to help their 
cause. 
Resistance lawyering often helped clients end up free, sometimes through 
exoneration, sometimes through purchased freedom, and sometimes through 
escape. Moreover, resistance lawyering effectively raised the political salience 
of a trial and thus served the abolitionist lawyers’ goal of making the proceeding 
into a proxy battle against slavery. Critically, the core strategies of resistance 
fused direct service and triage with broader political motives. Lawyers who saw 
the framework of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as unjust used the procedural 
tools within that system both to achieve the best possible outcomes for their 
clients, and to obstruct and dismantle the system itself.8 
 
on legal interventions and more on mass political action. See id. at 108–30. Importantly, although these 
positions were more or less legalistic and more or less radical, both understood that the purpose of legal 
action was to advance a position in a fundamentally political struggle and not to dismantle slavery itself 
through the legal system. 
 8. As I discuss further, infra, the success that lawyers achieved should not obscure the fact that 
most alleged fugitives (even those with lawyers) did not wind up free. Every time a human being was 
returned to bondage under color of federal law was a human and moral tragedy. In noting surprising 
successes, I do not intend to minimize the brutality and cruelty of either the system of slavery or the 
1850 Law. 
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Having observed the surprising success of resistance lawyering against the 
1850 law, Part III turns to the present to make two modest claims. First (and most 
modest) is that there are many examples of resistance lawyering in the present. 
Especially among cause lawyers, there are many examples of lawyers practicing 
within systems that they abhor and of using that practice to resist, obstruct, and 
destroy the systems themselves from within. I focus on three concrete examples: 
opposition to the death penalty, criminal defense, and deportation defense. In 
these and other cases, there are strong resonances between present practice and 
the historical story in Parts I and II. 
A second, and less modest, claim is that although there are many examples 
of what looks like resistance lawyering in the present, it is rare to find direct 
service and movement politics integrated as explicitly and as effectively as they 
were in the case of abolitionist lawyers in the 1850s. While acknowledging the 
many good reasons why this may be and recognizing fundamental differences 
between present and past, I propose that there is latent political opportunity to be 
tapped. Where resistance lawyering is happening, but where its politics are not 
explicit, there is an opportunity for today’s lawyers to learn from the past and 
leverage their daily practice within and against systems they oppose by 
integrating that practice more explicitly with a movement politics. 
Nothing in this second claim is intended to prescribe any specific politics 
for lawyers today. As was true in the 1850s, lawyers can and do come to their 
work with very different sets of political commitments and projects. Rather than 
suggesting any one political project, I suggest that lawyers today work to make 
the political commitments that bring them to the work clear.9 This clarity, in turn, 
creates the potential for linking a daily direct service practice to a broader 
political project (whatever that may be). Integrating practice with politics 
following the model of the abolitionist resistance lawyers creates both outward- 
and inward-facing benefits. Outwardly, integration promises to create space for 
daily practice to become more politically salient. Inwardly, integration works as 
a buffer against burnout and disenchantment, making it more likely that lawyers 
will be able to sustain their work over the long haul. 
It is not lost on me that many American lawyers committed to social change 
are living through a bleak moment. As national and global politics trend away 
from progress on racial justice, environmental protection, and economic 
equality, among other issues, courts have not emerged as stalwarts or saviors of 
individual rights.10 Slavery is at the root of some of the social problems that we 
 
 9. In this sense my modest prescription is procedural and pragmatic rather than substantive and 
normative. Without prejudging the outcome, I ask only that lawyers give an account of what they are 
doing and why. I propose that this clarity itself, regardless of the substance, is powerful. 
 10. Although legal institutions are unlikely to save us from rising right-wing ethnic nationalism, 
there is some evidence of hope that lawyers can play a role in “resisting” these political trends. Since the 
election of President Trump, law schools have seen a marked rise in applications—a rise that many 
attribute to a desire to engage in public service as a counterbalance to the politics that Trump represents. 
See Derek Hawkins, Did Law School Applications Get a ‘Trump Bump’? Maybe, WASH. POST (Feb. 
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face today, but it is also an archetype for those problems. Like slavery, mass 
incarceration, climate change, and economic inequality are not monsters that can 
be slain in court alone. Nevertheless, their tentacles frequently manifest in the 
daily practice of direct service lawyers. For those of us who feel inspired (or 
bound) to resist, there are real questions we can ask about the role legal practice 
can and should play in that resistance. One lesson to draw from a close 
examination of the resistance lawyers of the 1850s is that there may be untapped 
political potential in the struggle against the symptoms of the monstrous 
problems before us. 
In a political struggle, optimism is a precious commodity. Strange as it may 
be to say, this history of slavery offers a glimmer of precious optimism to lawyers 
engaged in social change movements today. 
I. 
THE LAW OF SLAVERY AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW 
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 is one of the most appalling moral 
atrocities in American political and legal history. The Law facilitated the 
rendition of alleged fugitive slaves back to slavery, severing them from their 
families, children, jobs, and freedom. From the moment that President Fillmore 
signed the Law, many understood it to be monumentally unjust. Seeing the Law 
in action only made it worse. As they watched their black neighbors forced at 
gunpoint through Northern streets bound for the South and slavery, even the most 
conservative Yankee Brahmins “went to bed one night old-fashioned, 
conservative, compromise Union Whigs & waked up stark mad Abolitionists.”11 
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 became a proxy for the broader sectional 
crisis simmering between North and South in the 1850s.12 It stood in for the 
whole catalog of evils of plantation slavery, as well as for the North’s supine 
compromise with the South.13 Many of the most searing depictions we retain of 
 
23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/02/23/did-law-school-
applications-get-a-trump-bump-maybe/?utm_term=.2604eaed35c9 [https://perma.cc/4ZQH-SCSW]. 
 11. These are the words of Amos Adams Lawrence, a wealthy mill owner in Massachusetts (his 
family gave their name to Lawrence, Massachusetts as well as to Lawrence, Kansas). Lawrence said 
this in 1854 in response to the Anthony Burns trial in Boston (see infra). SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, 
WRESTLING WITH HIS ANGEL: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, VOL. II, 1849–56, at 320 
(2017). Lawrence was so radicalized that he became a leading figure in the pre-secession political and 
military struggle in Kansas. Named “Bleeding Kansas,” settlers and sectionalists flooded Kansas and 
fought, killed, and died over the question of whether Kansas would allow or outlaw slavery. The most 
famous of these combatants was John Brown, who would become an abolitionist martyr after his failed 
raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859. See ROBERT K. SUTTON, STARK MAD ABOLITIONISTS: LAWRENCE, 
KANSAS, AND THE BATTLE OVER SLAVERY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2017). 
 12. “Sectional crisis” is a broad term that refers to the increasing tension between North and 
South in the years leading up to secession and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. 
 13. The radical abolitionist Wendell Phillips expressed a widespread Northern opinion 
succinctly in 1854: “the Government has fallen into the hands of the Slave Power completely. So far as 
national politics are concerned, we are beaten—there’s no hope.” Letter from Wendell Phillips to 
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the sectional crisis leading up to the Civil War were aimed at the 1850 Law and 
its operation. In “A Boston Ballad,” Walt Whitman bitterly mocked the passive 
citizens of Boston for watching helplessly as Anthony Burns was marched 
through the streets back to slavery.14 It was in response to this same scene that 
Henry David Thoreau famously declared independence from the state of 
Massachusetts, writing: “[m]y thoughts are murder to the State, and involuntarily 
go plotting against her.”15 
If the Fugitive Slave Law was unpopular in 1850, it has not aged well. It 
has become an archetypal unjust American law.16 In the halls of legal theory, it 
stands beside the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the Apartheid laws of South 
Africa, and the Jim Crow laws of the American South as a classic example of 
how we think about morally repugnant laws within a legal system.17 
Bad as it was, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was central to neither the 
administration nor the perpetuation of slavery in the United States. As a matter 
of substance, the Law was only a peripheral regulation serving the massive 
economic, political, and cultural force that was the practice of chattel slavery. 
Thus, any investigation of the struggles over the Law must begin with a clear-
eyed analysis of the Law’s place within the broader socio-legal framework of 
slavery. My intention here is not to offer a fully articulated theory of the law of 
slavery. However, in order to understand how the legal resistance to slavery 
worked, it is essential to place slavery within its own legal context. 
Slavery was, and had always been, woven tightly into the fabric of the 
American legal system. From the first decades of European arrival and conquest, 
slavery and slave labor formed an essential part of the political and economic 
 
Elizabeth Pease Nichol (Aug. 7, 1854) in 3 WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805–1879: THE STORY OF 
HIS LIFE TOLD BY HIS CHILDREN 410, 411 (1894) (emphasis in original). 
 14. The poem imagines a corps of phantom revolutionary war veterans appalled at the specter 
of federal despotism: “What troubles you, Yankee phantoms? [W]hat is all this chattering of bare 
gums? . . . If you blind your eyes with tears, you will not see the President’s marshal; [i]f you groan such 
groans, you might balk the government cannon.” WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 217 (1854). “A 
Boston Ballad” was originally published without a separate name as part of Whitman’s first edition of 
Leaves of Grass. 
 15. Henry David Thoreau, Slavery in Massachusetts 58 (1854). 
 16. A brief survey of lists of the worst laws in US history informally confirms this view. See, 
e.g., 10 Worst Laws in American History, LISTVERSE (Sept. 15, 2017), 
http://listverse.com/2017/09/15/10-worst-laws-in-american-history [https://perma.cc/C2E6-YCMJ] 
(listing the 1850 Law as the fifth worst law in American history). 
 17. For example, Robert Cover’s Justice Accused used the examples of antislavery judges who 
upheld the constitutionality of the 1850 Law to show how the formalist underpinnings of legal thought 
could uphold deeply immoral outcomes (the “moral/formal dilemma”). ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE 
ACCUSED (1975). Reviewing the book, Ronald Dworkin responded that there was a solution to this 
moral dilemma in his own theory of adjudication which, if applied, would have allowed antislavery 
judges to successfully rule that the Law was in fact unconstitutional. See Ronald Dworkin, The Law of 
Slave Catchers (Book Review), TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Dec. 5, 1975). This interchange has 
become canonical—which for my present purposes only goes to show just how settled our present 
impression is that the 1850 Law was a very, very, very bad law. 
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geography of the colonies.18 Coupled with the troubling presence of the 
preexisting brown-skinned population that white settlers sought to displace, the 
existence of black human beings bought and sold in the slave trade helped to 
structure the public understanding of the polity in the new colonies. White 
colonists began the work of creating racial difference and recognizing it at law 
almost as soon as the first black slaves arrived in Virginia.19 Moreover, as the 
colonies grew over time, the practice of slavery became further entrenched in the 
political, social, and legal culture. So too did the identification between 
blackness and slavery. By the first decades of the nineteenth century, the practice 
of slavery was entwined with a deeply held belief in white racial superiority. The 
cultural and social logic of racialized slavery had become central to the Southern 
“way of life” that was protected and rationalized by the American legal system. 
Slavery was recognized and validated by colonial statute, imperial policy, 
the United States Constitution, state statute, state courts, federal statutes, and 
federal courts. Slavery was unquestionably legal—indeed it was at the very heart 
of the American legal order.20 And yet, for much of the history of slavery in the 
United States, it was difficult to identify something that we might call a public 
“law of slavery.”21 Slavery’s very existence was protected by law, and its limits 
were defined by law, but the legal boundaries on slavery were created to ensure 
 
 18. Slavery was introduced in Virginia “as early as 1619, when the settlers traded for twenty 
blacks brought by a Dutch man-of-war.” THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 
1619–1816, at 3 (1996). Slaves were an integral part of settler life in the seventeenth century colonies, 
with households both North and South often owning one or a few slaves to help with the daily work of 
a somewhat spare frontier life. It was not until the development of plantation agriculture (tobacco, sugar, 
and rice—and only later cotton) in the first half of the eighteenth century that slavery transitioned from 
a more personal institution to the familiar model of the plantation system. It was then, as larger scale 
farming called for more laborers, that slave populations began to grow. See id. at 4–5. 
 19. See id. at 17–19. 
 20. Legal historians argue over precisely how central slavery was to the negotiations and 
compromises of the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Nevertheless, a consensus has developed over 
the last decades that slavery was an essential element of the legal settlement that emerged out of 
independence. In A SLAVEHOLDER’S UNION, George William Van Cleve laid out the structure of the 
argument in detail. He argued that the existence of slavery was at the heart of negotiations over the shape 
of the union, such that the issue cast its shadow over the entirety of the union forged by the Constitution. 
Van Cleve asserted that the Constitution was proslavery, arguing that a government that met all the goals 
that the founders had for their nation “could not have been formed and then have territorially expanded 
as America did unless it protected slavery and its expansion.” GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A 
SLAVEHOLDER’S UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 270 
(2010). Van Cleve was building on a robust literature placing slavery at the center of early American 
legal culture. See Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery 
Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1124–25 (2012) (reviewing Van Cleve’s book and collecting 
sources suggesting that most historians agree the Constitution was proslavery). 
 21. Let me not be misunderstood as saying that slavery was not articulated by a robust legal 
regime. Not only did slavery raise a host of legal questions, it also required an increasingly complex set 
of rules and doctrines as it grew and expanded. Men like Thomas Cobb wrote extensive treatises 
documenting the laws relating to slavery. See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF 
NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN HISTORICAL 
SKETCH OF SLAVERY (1858). 
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that the daily operation of the system of chattel slavery was largely left to private 
control. 
Slavery was more than a system of labor: it was a system of governance 
and a cultural foundation for social life. The public law of slavery outlined the 
boundaries of that logic by protecting ownership in slaves through the law of 
property and by setting minimal limits on the power of owners. Within this 
framework, slave owners wielded the combined despotic power of the patriarch, 
priest, and monarch over family, faith, and governance.22 Day in and day out 
across the slave states of the Southern United States, the system of slavery was 
articulated not through systemic lawmaking, but rather through the ad hoc, day-
to-day lived interactions between enslaved people and those who asserted 
ownership of them. Public law and the common law very rarely interfered with 
the details of that relationship. Rather, law policed the boundaries of the private 
relationships by protecting the property rights on which they rested.23 This 
explains why, when Southern colonies began to articulate statutory “slave codes” 
in the eighteenth century, those statutes dealt largely with the legal problems 
specific to defining human beings as property.24 Moreover, this explains why so 
much of what later came to be called the “law of slavery” was dedicated to 
defining the racial boundaries of who could and could not be considered 
property.25 As statutory law around slavery grew through the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the same pattern persisted: the laws existed to keep the core 
legal relationship between master and slave intact and insulated from legal 
inquiry or threat. 
Because slavery was a social, economic, and cultural practice enmeshed in 
and protected by law, it was not an easy target for legal reform. There was no 
law to repeal or case to overturn that would put an end to slavery.26 Moreover, 
even in the South, where slavery was protected by both statutory and case law, 
 
 22. I use these masculine images advisedly because most slave relationships were structured by 
a white patriarchal archetype where the white male planter owned and controlled his “property” just as 
he did his family—with very few restrictions on his power. That is not to say, of course, that all owner-
slave relationships followed this mold. Many women owned slaves, and the relationships between 
female slave owners (and wives of male slave owners) and their slaves were complex. See ELIZABETH 
FOX GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD 
SOUTH (1988). 
 23. See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 42. 
 24. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1778–79 (1996). 
 25. See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 21–36. 
 26. This is, of course, true about the legal attacks that might be brought in any fight against a 
deeply entrenched social problem. For example, pages and pages of scholarship have been devoted to 
showing how the mere overturning of Plessy v. Ferguson by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education did not, and could not have, ended segregation by mere force of judicial fiat. See, e.g., 
MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976). 
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the practice of slavery itself was insulated from challenge because the law 
protected (but did not directly regulate) the right of owners to govern the daily 
operation of slavery.27 
Slavery as an institution was thus mostly beyond the reach of legal 
challenge, which necessarily meant that challenges were only possible through 
collateral attacks on the institution from the margins. Those legal challenges 
were, in other words, part of a broad political strategy deployed against the 
system that supported and protected slavery. This need not diminish the 
importance of the legal fight against slavery. The stories in this Article show just 
how important legal resistance can be as part of a broad-based strategy for social 
change. However, understanding that legal challenges to slavery were not attacks 
on the heart of the system helps to explain why so much of the action was 
litigated in the margins: manumission, fugitives, and Northern personal liberty 
laws, to name a few examples. Supporters and opponents of slavery understood 
these cases to be proxy battles in a larger political struggle.28 But while the 
rhetorical and long-term stakes could be high, the immediate stakes were 
generally lower than the rhetoric would suggest.29 
Slavery was an iceberg the legal mass of which rested well below the visible 
surface of daily legal practice. What this meant for antislavery lawyers was that 
the central target—overturning slavery directly—was out of reach. The only way 
to resist slavery through legal means was through attacking the visible tip of the 
iceberg. 
 
 27. Perhaps the most infamous example of this general proposition came in State v. Mann, 13 
N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). In Mann, the defendant John Mann shot and wounded an enslaved woman 
named Lydia. Mann had hired Lydia out from her owner and therefore, under North Carolina law, had 
all the rights of an owner over Lydia. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that Mann could not be 
prosecuted for battery against Lydia because the master’s rights against his slaves could not be 
questioned in court. In Justice Ruffin’s words: 
We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the Courts of Justice. 
The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his master; 
that his power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not 
by the law of God. The danger would be great indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be 
called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to every temper, and every dereliction of 
menial duty. 
Id. at 265. 
 28. In nearly every case discussed infra in Part II, activists and lawyers immediately treated the 
arrest and trial of an alleged fugitive as a focal point to organize—not only to free the captive, but also 
to condemn the system of slavery and slave power that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 served. 
 29. For the actual litigants, the stakes of each individual fugitive slave case were, of course, as 
high as they could possibly be. What I mean by lower stakes is that frequently lawyers on both sides 
would suggest that the future of slavery (or the future of the union) hinged on the outcome of an 
individual case when, in reality, the institution of slavery was almost never under immediate practical 
threat. 
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A. The Fugitive Slave Laws 
1. The Tip of the Iceberg 
Because it was very difficult to frame direct challenges to slavery, the legal 
battles over slavery were mostly fought by proxy. Lawyers used the visible parts 
of the iceberg to point beneath the surface and challenge the broader problem. 
The most salient examples of this kind of practice were the many challenges that 
antislavery lawyers posed to the Fugitive Slave Laws. I will discuss these 
challenges in more detail in Part II, but in order to understand their context, it is 
necessary to lay out the legal architecture of the fugitive slave laws, which arise 
out of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the US Constitution. The story is the same as 
that found in Justice Story’s opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania: the legal logic of 
slavery rested on the recognition that slave owners had a right to property in their 
slaves that the law would respect and enforce.30 In the daily practice of slavery 
on plantations across the South, this right was secured by owners’ private force 
(violence or the threat of violence) with the backing of the public force of the 
state. The right only became insecure when a slave took it upon herself to run 
away. Owners could rely on Southern states to acknowledge and enforce their 
property claims, and so when a slave ran away from North Carolina to Virginia, 
there was generally no obstacle to the owner’s claim. Problems arose when a 
fugitive was able to cross into a free state that did not recognize or protect the 
property rights of a slave owner—in those situations, owners could not rely on 
Northern (and often hostile) state mechanisms to enforce their property rights. 
To be clear, actual incidences of escape were few, and most slave owners 
found it relatively easy to reclaim and return their alleged slaves to the South.31 
 
 30. Prigg involved a challenge to Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law. That law sought to 
protect free black residents of Pennsylvania from being seized and enslaved by “slave catchers” roaming 
across the border. 41 U.S. 539, 540–41 (1842). In Prigg, Justice Story held that the Pennsylvania law 
(and all the other similar laws in Northern states) was unconstitutional because in passing the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1793, Congress had exercised its legitimate power under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the 
Constitution, thus preempting states from regulating in the area. Id. More concretely, Story held that 
there was no problem under the federal law with the owner of a slave using self-help to recapture and 
forcibly bring an alleged fugitive back South. Id. (“The court have not the slightest hesitation in holding, 
that under and in virtue of the constitution, the owner of the slave is clothed with the authority in every 
state of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, wherever he can do it, without any breach of the 
peace or illegal violence.”). Jamal Greene has called it “the worst Supreme Court decision ever issued,” 
pointing out that Story’s holding that slave owners could use self-help as long they did not cause “illegal 
violence” meant, by inference, that violence against black people, free or fugitive, was always legal. 
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 428 (2011). 
 31. Although estimates vary, even the most robust accountings suggest that escapes were not a 
rampant problem. Supporting their argument that there were more escapes than generally thought, John 
Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger suggest that no more than one to two percent (fifty-thousand out 
of four-million) of slaves attempted to escape in any given year. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN 
SCHWENINGER, RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION 282 (2000). Of those who escaped, 
the vast majority did not end up free. See ERIC FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY 
OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 4 (2015) (estimating on the high end that five thousand slaves per 
year (less than 0.2 percent) successfully escaped). Most slaves who escaped travelled only a short 
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Moreover, at least until well into the 1850s, Northern states did not seek to 
obstruct all slave owners from reclaiming fugitives.32 In short, fugitive slaves 
never seriously threatened the institution of slavery in the South.33 Still, as 
national politics became increasingly rancorous over the issue of slavery on 
either side of the Mason-Dixon Line, legal battles over the Fugitive Slave Law 
of 1850 occupied an increasingly central place in national politics. Proxy battles 
in court might not have threatened slavery directly, but the supercharged political 
rhetoric surrounding those cases surely did. 
In saying this, I take nothing away from the importance of the cases that 
arose under the 1850 law. Indeed, in Part II I will argue that the work of 
antislavery lawyers litigating these cases was essential to the broader political 
movement resisting slavery. However, in order to understand the importance of 
these cases, it is essential to understand that they were peripheral until they were 
weaponized as existential threats to slavery through organizing and resistance 
lawyering. Lawyering against slavery by representing and seeking to protect 
fugitive slaves was a rhetorical and political proxy war against an otherwise 
unassailable system. This meant that, to the extent that an abolitionist lawyer saw 
himself as fighting the broader battle for the end of slavery, lawyering had to be 
a tool in a larger project. 
 
distance, and despite the remarkable stories of ingenuity and organization surrounding the Underground 
Railroad, most escapes were unplanned and short-lived. The majority of successful escapes originated 
in border states where the distance to the state line was shorter. Other slaves escaped into the wilderness 
and the swamps. But the fact remains that most slaves who sought to escape were likely recaptured 
relatively quickly and returned to slavery. 
 32. Personal liberty laws were intended to make it more difficult for slave owners to reclaim 
alleged fugitives. The laws required legal process, criminalized the kidnapping of free blacks, and 
mandated that state authorities not cooperate with federal or private efforts to reclaim fugitives. Even 
the most radical laws, such as Massachusetts’ “Latimer Law” (which prohibited state officials from 
cooperating with the rendition of alleged fugitives), allowed for the possibility that a slave owner could 
successfully reclaim an alleged fugitive, providing the owner observed proper process and did not seek 
state assistance. See THOMAS MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 
1780–1861, at 109–17 (2001). 
 33. There has been vigorous scholarly debate over a related question: did the 1850 Law have 
any practical value for the South beyond rhetoric? James McPherson argued that the Law mattered “less 
for practical advantage than as a matter of principle.” JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 
79 (1988). Others have responded that the Law did matter substantively to the South for reasons beyond 
rhetoric and honor. See WILLIAM FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION 502-503 (1991) (arguing that 
the Fugitive Slave Law was of primary importance to border state slave owners who were most at risk 
of having a slave flee); Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Barry R. Weingast, The Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850: Symbolic Gesture or Rational Guarantee? (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153528 [https://perma.cc/SZ82-WXCT] 
(arguing that the Law sought to protect material financial interests as part of an ongoing effort to protect 
the viability of slavery in the South). Though they disagree over whether the Law had some material 
benefit to slave owners, none of these scholars suggest that fugitive slaves posed a substantial systemic 
risk to slavery. 
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2. The Mechanics of the Fugitive Slave Laws 
a. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 
Since before the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, the rendition 
of fugitive slaves had been a critical part of the legal system protecting slavery 
in North America.34 A provision for returning fugitive slaves to their owners was 
therefore understood to be an essential element of any constitutional compromise 
in 1787.35 The Fugitive Slave Clause in the Constitution promised to protect the 
property of slave owners, but did not provide any administrative mechanism for 
that protection.36 As a result, in 1793 Congress passed the first Fugitive Slave 
Law, outlining a system for processing the claims of masters and sending alleged 
fugitives back into slavery.37 
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 contemplated that putative slave owners 
could find and then “seize or arrest” an alleged fugitive and bring her before 
either a federal or state court. In court, the slave owner would have to prove “to 
the satisfaction of such Judge or magistrate” that the alleged fugitive was, indeed, 
her slave. This proof could be made by “oral testimony” or by an affidavit from 
a court in the slave owner’s home state. Once that proof was established, the 
court would issue a certificate to the slave owner granting her permission to 
remove the alleged fugitive back to her home state.38 
The Law of 1793 also contemplated punishment for those who sought to 
obstruct the operation of the Law through escape or other means. Anyone who 
“knowingly and willingly” obstructed the slave owner, rescued an alleged 
fugitive, or harbored a fugitive was subject to a $500 fine that would be paid to 
the slave owner as compensation.39 
 
 34. “The interstate rendition of fugitive slaves among the American states was a well-
established constitutional tradition by 1787.” WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 78 (1977). Wiecek goes on to summarize laws meant 
to keep servants (white and black) from escaping, dating back to the earliest days of European 
colonization in the seventeenth century. 
 35. Although some historians have debated the importance of the clause in the negotiations, I 
am persuaded by the dominant view that the clause was critical to the overall compromise. George 
William Van Cleve makes the case best, concluding that the fact that the clause was not the subject of 
vigorous debate at the convention was not an indication that it was not important; rather, it “was born 
without controversy because it was a consensus means of controlling fugitive slavery that served the 
congruent sociopolitical interests of various states.” VAN CLEVE, supra note 20, at 168. 
 36. The text of the clause is famously opaque, requiring that states deliver alleged fugitives up 
to their owners, but saying nothing more. “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
 37. In fact, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was part of a larger bill that governed the rendition 
of criminal fugitives as well. Only Sections 3 and 4 of the Law addressed fugitive slaves. See Act of 
Feb. 12, 1973, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302 (“An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from 
the service of their masters”, hereinafter: “the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.”). 
 38. See id. at § 3. 
 39. Id. at § 4. 
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The Law of 1793 created a forum for adjudicating slave owners’ claims, 
making it relatively easy for owners to make and successfully prosecute their 
claims and to enslave previously free black residents of Northern states.40 Still, 
opposition to slavery was growing in many Northern states. With that opposition 
came a growing political movement seeking to protect alleged fugitive slaves 
from being sent South. And in response, Southern states were starting to wring 
their hands about the law’s inadequate protections and the risk to their property 
rights posed by Northern antislavery sentiment. 
Beginning in the early years of the nineteenth century, a few Northern states 
began to take steps to limit the right of slave owners to recapture alleged 
fugitives. The first wave of legislation attacked an unanswered question in the 
law: did slave owners have the right to recapture alleged fugitives through “self-
help”?41 Supporters of slavery adamantly argued that the law protected the right 
to recapture without resorting to any legal process and that the law’s procedures 
existed to aid slave owners who needed help, not to place a bar before those who 
did not. Northerners responded with the concern that recapture through self-help 
was little more than kidnapping. Even stipulating (as many did) that slave owners 
had the right to recapture their slaves in general, self-help without legal process 
put free blacks living in the North at risk of being kidnapped, brought South, and 
enslaved.42 In response to these concerns, in 1819 Northern states began to pass 
laws requiring that any person seeking to remove an alleged fugitive slave from 
the state must follow the procedures laid out in the 1793 Law.43 
These laws would become known generally as “Personal Liberty Laws.” 
Although every state approached the problem slightly differently, in general 
these laws had three aims. First, they increased the penalties for kidnapping 
while making it clear that taking anyone out of the state by force or pretense 
would be construed as kidnapping.44 Second, they barred state and local officials 
from aiding in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, leaving enforcement, 
in effect, up to the federal government alone.45 Third, personal liberty laws 
 
 40. Whether these individuals were truly fugitives or not, they were all living as free people 
before they were captured. Thus, the distinction between kidnapping a person who had never been 
enslaved (like Solomon Northup in Twelve Years a Slave) and re-enslaving a person who had previously 
been enslaved is less morally salient than it might seem. Still, it is true that the permissive standards and 
lack of progress also made it easy (and lucrative) for putative owners to make false claims to alleged 
fugitives or even to openly kidnap free blacks without fear of legal repercussions. See CAROL WILSON, 
FREEDOM AT RISK: THE KIDNAPPING OF FREE BLACKS IN AMERICA, 1780–1865 (2015). 
 41. See MORRIS, supra note 32, at 28–29. “Self-help” refers to a property owner taking 
possession of property on their own authority without seeking recourse to or authorization from the state. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Ohio was the first state to pass such a law in 1819, and other states followed with more 
robust versions. Id. 
 44. Id. at 45. This meant in practice that “self-help” measures taken by slave owners would be 
construed as kidnapping. 
 45. See id. The question of whether state and local officials could be forced to enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Law was hotly debated and the subject of much Southern resentment. It was tentatively 
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created more robust procedural protections for alleged fugitives who found their 
way into state courts. The Law of 1793 was not clear on precisely what due 
process rights would be afforded to alleged fugitives, but in practice the answer 
was: not much. In state after state, Northern personal liberty laws pushed back 
against this, construing alleged fugitives as residents and even citizens of the 
state where they were residing. As such, the laws sought to cloak these residents 
with full due process rights to ensure that those who were returned to slavery 
had, in fact, been slaves.46 
The obstructions that Northern states placed in the way of recapturing 
fugitive slaves over time became a bugbear for Southern supporters of slavery. 
Bemoaning the loss of money and the threat to the stability of their “sacred” 
property rights, Southern politicians claimed that the 1793 Law had become dead 
letter and agitated for a new, more robust, and more draconian fugitive slave 
law.47 
b. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 
The 1850 Law was the result of this agitation—but it was also the result of 
a broad compromise drafted by the moderate “great men” of the nation with the 
intention of staving off an impending sectional crisis.48 The 1850 Law was 
passed as part of a package of measures that included abolishing the slave trade 
in Washington, D.C., admitting California as a free state, and allowing the new 
territories seized in the Mexican-American War between Texas and California 
to choose whether or not to adopt slavery by popular vote.49 Historians have 
debated whether or not the compromise was a “good deal” for the North or the 
South and whether it accelerated or delayed the arrival of the Civil War.50 What 
is not subject to debate, however, is that the 1850 Law was adopted in almost 
precisely the form that its Southern supporters desired. 
Intended to fix the weaknesses that had made the 1793 Law “dead letter,” 
the new law had two primary goals. First, it made it easier for slave owners to 
reclaim alleged fugitive slaves from free states. Second, it increased the penalties 
levied against those who provided aid and comfort to alleged fugitives.51 
 
resolved in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), but it remained a very sore spot throughout the 
sectional crisis that led up to the Civil War. 
 46. See MORRIS, supra note 32, at 71–93. 
 47. R.J.M. BLACKETT, THE CAPTIVE’S QUEST FOR FREEDOM: FUGITIVE SLAVES, THE 1850 
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 5–6, 43 (2018). 
 48. See Paul Finkelman, The Appeasement of 1850, in CONGRESS AND THE CRISIS OF THE 
1850S, at 36 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon, eds. 2012). Finkelman is very harsh on Henry Clay 
and Daniel Webster, two of the statesmen behind the deal. Other scholars are more sympathetic to the 
moderates who brokered the deal, arguing that they were facing a looming civil war and so were doing 
whatever they could to avert disaster. See ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE 
UNION 749 (1993). 
 49. See Finkelman, supra note 48, at 49–56. 
 50. See id. at 36–38, 79. 
 51. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 7. 
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In service of the first goal, the 1850 Law created a new federal 
infrastructure for the arrest and trial of alleged fugitive slaves. The Law 
empowered the formerly lowly office of federal commissioner with full judicial 
powers in cases arising under the 1850 Law.52 Commissioners were judicial 
officers appointed by Article III federal judges. The new law gave the circuits 
power to hire more commissioners and then gave those commissioners the power 
to hear and decide cases under the 1850 Law from start to finish.53 The 
commissioners also had a newly empowered force of federal marshals at their 
command, who in turn were empowered to call out a posse of local citizens to 
aid them in apprehending and guarding alleged fugitives. 
Once arrested and before the commissioners, the proceedings in these cases 
were intended to be summary—there would be no juries.54 A claiming owner 
needed only bring a certificate from her home state and offer “satisfactory” proof 
that the alleged fugitive was indeed her slave. The alleged fugitives were not 
allowed to testify on their own behalf, nor were they guaranteed counsel or any 
procedural protections at all.55 Infamously, commissioners were paid $10 per 
case if they remanded an alleged fugitive to slavery and only $5 if they ruled that 
she was free.56 Taken as a whole, the Law made it clear that the goal was to 
create a summary hearing that would quickly deliver an alleged fugitive slave 
back to her owner without fuss, delay, or political uproar. The scales were 
heavily weighted against anyone unfortunate enough to be caught up in the 
process of the law—by design. 
The law’s second mechanism for helping Southern slaveowners was to 
crack down more harshly on anyone (North or South) who offered aid and 
comfort to alleged fugitives. The Law of 1793 imposed a $500 fine on anyone 
who obstructed the operation of the Law through rescuing or harboring an 
alleged fugitive. The 1850 Law doubled the maximum fine to $1000 and added 
a possible prison term of up to six months.57 Northern opponents of slavery were 
enraged that the Law explicitly criminalized their humanitarian commitments. 
These moderate increases in punishment seemed like extreme impingements on 
 
 52. See Fugitive Slave Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, § 4; repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, 
13 Stat. 200. 
 53. See id. at §§ 3–4. Despite the Law’s insistence that commissioners had concurrent 
jurisdiction with federal district courts, in practice it was not unheard of for duly appointed Article III 
judges to take jurisdiction away from the commissioner hearing the case—especially when the case 
promised to be controversial or high-profile. The questionable legitimacy of the commissioners was the 
source of one of the most powerful legal objections to the Law. Its opponents argued that nothing in the 
Constitution authorized Congress to create new judicial positions outside of the Article III appointment 
process. As a result, the abolitionists argued, no proceedings before the commissioners were 
constitutionally legitimate. See WILLIAM HARNED, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL: ITS HISTORY AND ITS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 19–20 (1850). 
 54. Fugitive Slave Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, § 6 repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, 13 
Stat. 200. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at § 8. 
 57. See id. at § 5. 
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their freedoms, and Northerners perceived the Law as a usurpation of Northern 
power in service of Southern aristocrats and the “slave power.”58 
Both mechanisms of the Law sparked immediate outrage in the North. 
Town meetings were called, vigilance committees were assembled, and fiery 
speeches were made promising that Northerners and abolitionists would resist 
the Law at all costs and protect all alleged fugitives and free blacks from 
Southern slave catchers.59 Supporters of slavery and defenders of the Law rallied 
to its defense, decrying their opponents as agents of chaos and fomenters of civil 
unrest.60 Although the new law was peripheral to the broader practice of slavery, 
the 1850 Law immediately took center stage in the bitter sectional dispute that 
gripped national politics. Conflicting views on slavery were at the heart of a 
growing political divide in the nation, and the 1850 Law was a perfect proxy for 
the larger battle. A strike against the Law came to be seen (by both sides) as a 
strike against slavery and for abolition, while on the flip side, faithful 
enforcement of the Law came to be seen as essential to the preservation of 
slavery and the union. 
II. 
LAWYERS RESISTING SLAVERY 
Either as a cause or a consequence of modern negative opinions about the 
1850 Law, there is a widely held view that it was a disaster for the fugitives who 
were caught under its terms. Historians have generally reported that nearly all 
the alleged fugitives who were swept up in the grasp of the Fugitive Slave Law 
were returned to slavery. While historians have debated whether the number of 
alleged fugitives returned to slavery was or should have been significant to the 
sectional politics of the moment,61 almost no one has disputed the basic 
 
 58. Perhaps the most famous example of Northern outrage at having their compassion 
criminalized comes from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, where the fictional Senator Bird 
and his wife debate whether or not a law can be just that criminalizes the duty to help another human 
being. Although Senator Bird was a supporter of the Law in the abstract, he winds up providing aid to 
the fugitives that pass through his home—demonstrating by his actions the injustice of the Law. 
Reflecting on this scene, Stowe turns to her Southern readers and puts a fine point on her moral: “Ah, 
good brother! Is it fair for you to expect of us services which your brave, honorable heart would not 
allow you to render, were you in our place?” HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 134 
(1852). 
 59. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 15–25 (describing the explosion of public opposition to 
the Law in the months following its passage). 
 60. See id. at 25. In many cases, it was the moderate voices like Daniel Webster and Stephen 
Douglas who were the most avid defenders of the Law and the most alarmist about the risks of opposing 
it. Douglas, for instance, delivered a nearly four-hour stemwinder of a speech condemning the Chicago 
City Council for pledging to defy the Law in October 1850, arguing that the Law was constitutional and 
that opposition to the Law was treasonous. See id. at 23. 
 61. Paul Finkelman delivers the standard line about the Law’s draconian effects on alleged 
fugitives, arguing that “[b]etween 1850 and 1861 about a thousand blacks would be returned to bondage 
under the law” with very few gaining their freedom. Finkelman, supra note 48, at 77. But Finkelman 
goes on to argue that this number was actually small in the Southern view because it represented only a 
tenth of the estimated ten thousand slaves who escaped during that period. Id. Thus, for Finkelman, 
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observation that the effects of the Law were catastrophic (and that slavery was a 
near-certain outcome) for those unlucky enough to be caught up in its summary 
process.62 
Having closely examined a more complete set of the cases brought under 
the Law during the decade that it was in effect, I have concluded that the numbers 
that we have come to accept tell an incomplete story.63 Out of 210 cases invoking 
 
despite being a disaster for those alleged fugitives who were caught, the Law was not as effective as its 
Southern proponents had hoped. Id. RJM Blackett’s recent work agrees with the spirit of Finkelman’s 
observation. Blackett demonstrates that many fugitives were able to avoid the Law’s grasp and that local 
political opposition to the Law blunted its force. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 457–59. 
 62. Blackett’s recent book comes closest to asking the questions of the received wisdom that I 
am asking here. Advancing his own claim that there were more paths to freedom around and through 
the Law than we have thought, he quibbles with Stanley Campbell’s data (discussed infra) in a limited 
way, arguing that more total fugitives wound up free during the first fifteen months after the Law’s 
passage than Campbell had reported. See id. at 69. Blackett’s observation is consistent with the data that 
I have collected here. Unlike Blackett, I have sought to extend the comparison between my own research 
and the previous research across the full scope of the Law’s duration. Moreover, unlike Blackett, I have 
focused expressly on cases where I could be confident that the machinery of the Law had been activated 
in some measurable way. 
 63. A note on my methodology: in order to assemble the set of cases that I analyze here, I went 
case-by-case through the sources that had previously compiled cases, looking for primary source 
accounts of the cases in contemporaneous books, newspaper reports, court reports, and any other 
available resources I could uncover (private journals, correspondence, other collected papers). These 
compiling sources include comprehensive nineteenth century accounts (Samuel May’s The Fugitive 
Slave Law and its Victims and Levi Coffin’s Reminiscences of Levi Coffin) as well as more modern 
accounts (primarily Campbell’s The Slavecatchers and RJM Blackett’s The Captives’ Quest for 
Freedom). Using these as starting points, I was able to search the primary sources for additional cases 
that had not been previously compiled or considered. 
  Once I had done this primary research, I was able to ask a consistent set of questions of the 
cases: had process been initiated under the 1850 Law? Were there lawyers involved? Who was the 
commissioner? What was the outcome? I then coded each of the cases and generated the rough statistical 
analysis that follows. 
  To my knowledge, this dataset is the most complete and well-articulated list of cases arising 
under the Law of 1850. That being said, the nature of the inquiry and the sources indicates that it is a 
near certainty that my survey has missed some cases. For the most part, commissioners under the Law 
of 1850 did not keep formal written records and did not publish their decisions in any form of legal 
reporter. It is likely that there were some jurisdictions where the Law’s summary process was employed 
as it was intended—meaning that alleged fugitives could have been processed and remanded to slavery 
without any notice in the press or any other written record. It is just as likely that there were instances 
that never made their way into the press where process was initiated but where the alleged fugitive 
escaped. Add to this the reality that digitization of the newspapers from the era continues to grow (and 
that the text recognition software necessary to search those newspapers is imperfect but continues to 
improve) and it seems a near certainty that there are cases which I have not yet found. 
  This is to say that the raw numbers in this study should not be taken to be a claim of 
conclusive truth, but rather a best (and better than previously known) estimate. With the addition of 
cases to the data set, of course the percentages that I cite below will be liable to change. Even so, I can 
say with some confidence that it is unlikely that this data set will grow in ways that undermine the 
underlying conclusions. My extensive research revealed just how comprehensive the work of the 
scholars before me had been. While I did unearth a handful of new cases, I also found that most of what 
I was finding had been recorded somewhere before me. In that context, my contribution here is less a 
trove of new cases and more a new and comprehensive coding of those cases focused on the specific 
questions that I am asking about the enforcement of the 1850 Law. This means that while I am not 
claiming that this data set is complete or comprehensive (what historian could possibly be so deluded!), 
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some form of process under the Law,64 eighty-one (38.5 percent) of the fugitives 
ended their cases as free people. Behind this surprising number, my research 
reveals that twenty-two (10.5 percent) of those 210 cases ended in exoneration; 
in forty-two cases (20 percent), the alleged fugitives escaped federal custody 
after the law’s processes had been initiated; and in seventeen cases (8.1 percent) 
the alleged fugitive was freed soon after being judged to be a slave through 
purchase by abolitionists and their allies in the cities where the trials took place.65 
This is a rich data set and many conclusions might be drawn from it. One 
such conclusion, as I outline below, is that lawyers were among the many actors 
who made it possible for nearly forty percent of the alleged fugitives to end up 
free. In victory and defeat in the courtroom, antislavery lawyers used their 
practice under and against the law to build the infrastructure for political change 
and victory. Practicing within a system that they abhorred (while deriding the 
injustice and oppression of the system) achieved surprisingly good outcomes 
within that system and helped to build a political narrative that was necessary to 
challenge the system itself. 
In case after case, lawyers used the very limited procedural protections and 
the somewhat more robust platform provided by summary process under the Law 
 
I can say with some confidence that the broader intervention questioning the conventional narrative of 
the Law’s impact and lawyers’ role in that new narrative will survive future additions to the data set. 
  That said, I have posted a collection of my research as a working paper on my website. See 
Daniel Farbman & Benjamin Grossman, Resisting in Process: Human Beings Ensnared in the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850 (2019) (unpublished working collection, Boston College Law School) (available 
at http://works.bepress.com/daniel-farbman/11 [https://perma.cc/43MP-Y347]). I am eager for this to 
be a dynamic research tool that scholars working on these cases can use to build a collective and open-
access knowledge base. No one would be happier than I should that resource grow enough to change 
the narrative yet again! 
 64. Identifying what counts as process under the Law is an admittedly complex task. For some 
cases it is easy. In 159 of the 210 cases, there is evidence of a full hearing before a United States 
Commissioner who ruled or was prepared to rule on the merits of whether the alleged fugitive should 
be returned to slavery. In many other cases, however, the case is less clear. The Fugitive Slave Law of 
1793 explicitly stated that it was permissible for a slave owner to use “self-help” to arrest an alleged 
fugitive and return her to slavery if approved by a Southern court’s process. This provision was upheld 
by Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), and there is no reason to think that the 
Law of 1850 modified the rule. Thus, it could be argued that every single alleged fugitive (and kidnapped 
free black person) who was re-enslaved between 1850 and 1863 was returned under the provisions of 
the Law. By the same token, however, it could also be argued that every fugitive who successfully 
avoided capture during that same period escaped the clutches of the Law. The realities of the archive are 
such that it is impossible to collect any kind of reliable information about precisely how many fugitives 
were returned without any legal process or how many fugitives escaped. For this reason, I have limited 
my own sample of cases to those where I could find evidence of some process being invoked under the 
Law of 1850. In practice that means that I have included cases where I found proof that a United States 
Commissioner granted a warrant under the terms of the Law and where a federal official was acting on 
that warrant. By the same token, I have excluded cases where an alleged fugitive was seized through 
self-help by the alleged owner or his agents as well as cases where the only process provided came in 
state court. 
 65. This is a somewhat shifty figure because in a few cases where an alleged fugitive’s freedom 
was purchased, there was an interval between the end of the trial (and a temporary return to slavery) and 
the subsequent emancipation of the slave. 
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to pursue two projects at the same time. The first project was to create the 
circumstances under which their client might avoid being returned to slavery. 
This meant seeking delay wherever possible, either by requesting continuances 
before the commissioner or by clogging up the process in other ways. It also 
meant working hard to get the alleged fugitives out of federal custody and into 
state custody, where the chances for escape were greater and where there was 
one additional barrier between the fugitive and a summary return to slavery.66 
Both delay and custody disputes created time and space for political organizing 
to take place—organizing that sometimes manifested as plans for escape, and 
sometimes allowed for the collection of funds to purchase the alleged fugitive’s 
freedom. The extra time also served another (though less central) aim: 
substantive legal victory in the proceedings themselves. These victories, while 
rare, were not impossible. But they were only possible where the summary 
process had slowed down and lawyers had a chance to turn the proceedings into 
something more like a trial and less like a kidnapping. Behind all three of these 
strategies to achieve the ultimate freedom of the alleged fugitive was political 
organizing. Delay, confusion, and legal argument not only made rescue more 
likely, but also transformed the proceedings from a summary rendition into a 
community referendum on slavery. 
This transformation reflected a second purpose motivating the lawyers. 
With every fugitive slave case, Northern lawyers drew more attention to the 
broader cause of abolition. Every case became an opportunity to broadcast an 
antislavery message to the community and the nation. The summary process of 
the Fugitive Slave Law, which had been designed to facilitate the protection of 
Southern property, provided the venue for some of the loudest and most effective 
attacks on the system of slavery that the nation had ever seen. Ironically, these 
attacks often emphasized just how terrible and oppressive the Fugitive Slave Law 
was (despite the fact that lawyers were actually achieving better results than 
expected).67 The political power built through these cases was, very occasionally, 
part of what pressed a commissioner to decide that an alleged fugitive was in fact 
 
 66. State jail was a temporarily safe space for an alleged fugitive because federal authorities 
would have to extract an alleged fugitive from state custody before they could exercise their authority 
under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to return an alleged fugitive to slavery. For a dramatic example 
of the push and pull over custody, see the case of Rosetta Armstead, infra Part II.b.3.b. 
 67. There is a striking parallel here (one of many) between practice under the Fugitive Slave 
Law and today’s immigration practice. As I will develop in Part III, there is evidence that present-day 
immigration lawyers are actually remarkably successful in preventing their clients from being deported 
(again, without overstating the case or minimizing the human tragedies suffered by those who are 
deported). But advocates for undocumented immigrants are more likely to emphasize the ways in which 
the system oppresses than the ways in which lawyers resist that system. This makes perfect political 
sense—especially in the context of true resistance lawyering where the victories achieved in the 
courtroom are victories in spite of the system rather than vindications of the system itself. For a lawyer 
ambivalent about the legal system that she inhabits, the victories within that infrastructure do not, of 
their own force, legitimate that system. 
2019] RESISTANCE LAWYERING 1899 
free.68 More often, however, the political organizing around a trial was as 
concerned with mobilization as it was with the individual result. Indeed, the most 
galvanizing moments for antislavery lawyers were likely their losses, where the 
injustice of the law was enacted for all to see, dramatically supporting the 
rhetoric developed at trial.69 
In the Sections that follow, I offer two ways of seeing the lawyers’ 
surprisingly powerful role in fighting back against the Fugitive Slave Law. Both 
of these views emerge from new research that unsettles and reframes a story that 
most historians have taken for granted. The first of these views looks at the cases 
brought under the Fugitive Slave Law in the aggregate. Crunching what numbers 
I have, I discover that lawyers were surprisingly successful in their efforts to 
protect alleged fugitives caught up in the law’s processes. The second of these 
views is more detailed, taking a deep dive into a few individual stories to bring 
to light the tactics that lawyers used to get these surprising results. 
A. A New Account of Resistance Lawyering Under the Fugitive Slave Law 
There is a reason that historians have agreed that most alleged fugitives 
caught up by the Fugitive Slave Law were doomed to be sent back to slavery. In 
1970, Stanley Campbell published The Slavecatchers, an authoritative and 
brilliant compendium of every fugitive slave case that he could find. The book 
is a remarkable accomplishment. In 1970, there were no digital archives, no 
online library catalogs, and no searchable databases. Campbell scoured a 
remarkable breadth of sources to compile a nearly complete list of cases. 
Moreover, he coded each case carefully, noting date, location, number of cases 
involved, and the outcome.70 
 
 68. This sort of conclusion is necessarily speculative, since no commissioner ever admitted that 
the mob outside the door convinced him that it would be unwise to send a fugitive back to slavery. Still, 
there are a number of cases where commissioners likely granted continuances and allowed more 
evidence collection because of fear that too summary a process would lead to conflict. And there are a 
few instances where commissioners admitted after the fact that they felt strong political pressure from 
the antislavery movement. For examples of this, see the cases of Tamor Williams, Rosetta Armstead, 
and Lewis infra in Part II.B. For a broader discussion of commissioners’ role in enforcing the Law and 
resisting the Law, see BLACKETT, supra note 47 at 58–61. 
 69. One example is the Margaret Garner trial of 1856. Garner was the source for Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved. She had escaped from Kentucky and was caught with her family and children near 
Cincinnati. Rather than return to slavery, she murdered one of her children and tried to murder the others 
and herself before being arrested. The government’s “victory” in sending the slaves back to bondage 
affected huge shifts in local public opinion and served as galvanizing moments for antislavery 
organizing. On the Garner story, see STEVEN WEISENBURGER, MODERN MEDEA: A FAMILY STORY OF 
SLAVERY AND CHILD-MURDER FROM THE OLD SOUTH (1998). 
 70. Campbell coded the cases he collected into a few categories: “remanded by federal tribunal” 
(he would also note whether the remand was at government expense or not), “returned without due 
process,” “released,” and “rescued from federal custody.” STANLEY CAMPBELL, THE SLAVECATCHERS: 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860, at 202–03 (1970). 
1900 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:1877 
Since 1970, historians have mostly relied on Campbell’s work to conclude 
that the overwhelming majority of alleged fugitives were returned to slavery.71 
In his seminal history of the Civil War, James McPherson wrote that “[i]n the 
first fifteen months after its passage, eighty-four fugitives were returned to 
slavery and only five released.” More striking: “[d]uring the full decade of the 
1850s, 332 were returned and only eleven declared free.”72 More recently, in 
2010 Stephen Lubet offered a somewhat less drastic account. Lubet, also citing 
Campbell, suggested that there were 191 known proceedings under the Fugitive 
Slave Law between 1850 and 1861, and that slaveholders’ claims were denied 
only thirty-four times.73 
Brilliant as his compilation was, Campbell’s numbers are imperfect for 
several reasons. First, based on the data itself, the numbers tell us less than we 
might think. One problem is that Campbell does not always distinguish clearly 
(or accurately) between incidents where fugitive slaves were reported recaptured 
with no federal process and incidents where the machinery of the Fugitive Slave 
Law was engaged.74 While the Law of 1850 surely gave license to some 
kidnappers and vigilante slave owners, instances of kidnapping and self-help 
recapture were, by definition, not within the legal process created by the Law.75 
A second problem with Campbell’s data is that he is interested only in the 
first-order outcome of the cases that he collects, not in the ultimate resolution. 
 
 71. Campbell identified 332 total cases, of which 298 resulted in the alleged fugitive being 
returned to slavery. See id. Campbell found eleven cases that resulted in the fugitive being released and 
twenty-three that resulted in either rescue or escape. Of these 332 cases, Campbell tallied 191 cases that 
“came before a federal tribunal.” Though this number is only nineteen fewer than the 210 that I found, 
Campbell and I disagree about how to classify some of the individual cases that he collects, meaning 
that the discrepancies between our accounts are more pronounced than the numbers make obvious. 
 72. MCPHERSON, supra note 33, at 80. 
 73. STEPHEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON TRIAL 5 
(2010). McPherson and Lubet are notable because they attempt to carefully parse Campbell’s numbers, 
but the extent of the settled view is evident from other sources as well. William Freehling, in his 
influential history of the Antebellum period, relied on Campbell to conclude that “90% of the 332 alleged 
fugitives tried under [the Law of 1850] were despatched southwards.” FREEHLING, supra note 33, at 
536. This conclusion, in turn, shows up in the notes of one of the leading Constitutional Law casebooks. 
See Paul Brest, et al., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 265 
(2015, 6th Ed.) (citing FREELING, supra note 33). 
 74. To be clear, Campbell does draw a distinction between cases where a federal tribunal was 
convened and those where no tribunal was convened. The trouble is that Campbell’s account is not 
always accurate. Take, for example, the case of two alleged fugitive slaves captured in December of 
1855 in Baltimore. The two women were caught and returned immediately to Virginia with no evidence 
of any federal intervention or process. Campbell lists the two as “remanded by fed. Tribunal,” but the 
contemporary accounts of the incident that I have found suggest that there was no federal tribunal 
involved at all. See CAMPBELL, supra note 70, at app. 
 75. There are real causal questions to be asked about the degree to which the Law of 1850 gave 
license to Southerners to prosecute their claims of ownership and recapture more freely. Scholars have 
debated this point vigorously in the past decades. I see my own argument adjacent to, but not committed 
to, a side of the debate. Because I am interested in the work of lawyers and in the specific legal process 
prescribed by the Law, my own focus is on the cases where that process was engaged rather than on the 
broader (and ultimately unanswerable) causal questions about just how the Law influenced the actions 
of Southern slavecatchers. 
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For this reason, Campbell does not remark on the many cases where alleged 
fugitives were adjudged slaves but ended up free because their allies had 
organized to purchase their freedom. My research suggests that there were at 
least seventeen such cases, or eight percent of the total cases where federal 
process was involved.76  
The broader issue with relying on Campbell’s data, however, is simply that 
it was gathered forty years ago. Today, with the aid of digital archives (and the 
invaluable guidance of Campbell’s own path-breaking research), we have the 
tools to ask a much more thorough set of questions, from which a different 
outline of the story emerges. More than any quibble with a particular case 
collected and coded by Campbell, my research suggests the need to revise the 
core conclusion that Campbell’s findings have been used to support. Campbell 
has been cited in support of the now-accepted proposition that somewhere 
around ninety percent of alleged fugitives were sent back to slavery under the 
Fugitive Slave Law.77 My research concludes that the number is actually sixty 
percent and that nearly forty percent of slaves caught up in the process of the 
Law actually ended up free. 78 
As a secondary effect, the understanding—created in part by Campbell’s 
data—that nearly every alleged fugitive was sent back has contributed to the 
view that lawyers and judges were either complicit in, or powerless to oppose, 
the blanket enforcement of the Law.79 My research reveals that, in fact, lawyers 
were surprisingly powerful opponents of the operation of the Fugitive Slave 
Law. By using the limited tools provided to them under the Law, lawyers were 
instrumental in creating markedly better outcomes for their allegedly fugitive 
clients. Alleged fugitives who were represented by a lawyer in their federal 
proceedings were nearly twice as likely to end up free as those who were 
unrepresented.80 
To restate and summarize my findings, then: between the fall of 1850 and 
1863 (when the Fugitive Slave Law was last enforced in Washington, D.C.) I 
found 210 cases where process was initiated under the fugitive slave law. Of 
 
 76. See Farbman & Grossman, supra note 63. Most of these cases occurred during the first years 
of enforcement of the new law. One example is the story of James Hamlet. Hamlet was one of the first 
people arrested under the new law in the fall of 1850 in New York City. Hamlet was determined to be a 
fugitive by the commissioner at trial; after the trial, however, friends and allies gathered the funds to 
purchase his freedom. Although Hamlet was returned to Baltimore for a few days, the purchase 
happened quickly and he was soon back in New York City. See The Difference, N.H. PATRIOT & STATE 
GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1850, A2. In Campbell’s accounting, Hamlet counted as lost to slavery: “remanded 
by fed. tribunal at gov’t. expense.” See CAMPBELL, supra note 70 at 202–03. 
 77. See FREEHLING, supra note 33, at 536. 
 78. See Farbman & Grossman, supra note 63. 
 79. This view draws fuel from Robert Cover’s accusation in Justice Accused that judges and the 
legal profession more broadly were craven in the face of the Law, preferring to retreat to legal 
formalisms justifying adherence to the Law rather than to seek arguments and mechanisms to resist the 
operation of the Law from within the legal system. See COVER, supra note 17. 
 80. See Farbman & Grossman, supra note 63. 
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these 210 cases, nearly forty percent of them ended with the alleged fugitive as 
a free person. Of this number, eleven percent were exonerated, eight percent had 
their freedom purchased, and twenty percent escaped or were rescued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, it bears repeating that my research reveals that more than sixty 
percent of those caught in the process of the Fugitive Slave Law were returned 
to slavery or killed.81 Still, this data reveals that eighty-one of the 210 alleged 
fugitives that I have found who were caught up in the adjudication process of the 
1850 Law ended up free. 
Having discovered that the outcomes for alleged fugitives caught up in the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 were better than previously thought, the next 
question is why. One possible answer is that the Fugitive Slave Law was less 
draconian than we generally assume, but this idea is hard to defend. In the first 
place, the Law was designed with the primary purpose of facilitating the quick 
return of fugitive slaves to slavery. Process was summary, the evidentiary burden 
on claimants was low, it was nearly impossible for alleged slaves to establish 
their freedom, and the commissioners had strong incentives to find in favor of 
the claimant and against the alleged fugitive.82 Moreover, the politics 
surrounding the Law were just as explicitly harsh and proslavery. Northern 
moderates like Daniel Webster saw the Law as a necessary concession to the 
 
 81. And, of course, a return to slavery was frequently akin to a death sentence, as with the 
famous story of Margaret Garner, who died of exposure on a cotton plantation after being sent back to 
slavery and sold down the river. See MARK REINHARDT, WHO SPEAKS FOR MARGARET GARNER: THE 
TRUE STORY THAT INSPIRED TONI MORRISON’S BELOVED 43–45 (2010). 
 82. See supra Part I. 
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South to preserve the union.83 They were committed to seeing that the Law was 
enforced predictably and summarily. For example, when the residents of Boston 
threatened to block the return of Anthony Burns to slavery in 1854, the federal 
government sent in the army to escort him through the streets and to his waiting 
ship South.84 Even more convincing, however, is that there were only twenty-
two out of 210 (10.5 percent) cases where a commissioner or a judge concluded 
that the alleged fugitive was free. When the system was operating as designed, 
it was as draconian as we have always thought it to be. 
Another, better, explanation is that grassroots community opposition 
thwarted the Law more effectively than previously thought.85 Fifty-nine (28.1 
percent) alleged fugitives ended up free either by escape or by having their 
freedom purchased. For an escape to be successful, the support of the abolitionist 
community was essential, either through an actual mob or through assistance 
after the escape itself. Indeed, once the abolitionist community in a city or town 
was aware that a fugitive had been detained, one of the first orders of business 
for the vigilance committee was to draft a plan of escape. Purchases of freedom 
were even more reliant on community organization. In the typical case, activists 
would circulate through the community collecting donations until they had 
gathered enough to meet the purchase price.86 
Linked at the hip to community power is the explanation at the heart of this 
Article: that lawyers acting in concert with grassroots opposition to slavery 
played an integral role in keeping alleged fugitives free. In cases where alleged 
fugitives were represented by counsel, nearly half ended up free (47.7 percent).87 
Compare this to cases with no lawyers involved, where fewer than one quarter 
of alleged fugitives ended up free (23.3 percent).88 These statistics are consistent 
with the detailed narratives in the next section. Although the process provided 
by the Law was minimal and unfair, lawyers used every scrap of procedure that 
they could grasp to slow down and frustrate that process. They then used the 
bully pulpit of the courtroom to help build community support for the alleged 
fugitive. Sometimes this led to a movement to purchase her freedom, sometimes 
 
 83. Webster articulated this view of the compromise most completely and most infamously in 
his “Seventh of March” speech on the Senate floor. See Daniel Webster, The Compromises of the 
Constitution, in DANIEL WEBSTER & BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TEFFT, SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 
489–536 (1854). 
 84. ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND SLAVERY IN 
EMERSON’S BOSTON 203–19 (1998). 
 85. This is one of the core theses of Blackett’s recent history. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 
xi. 
 86. Consider, again, the case of James Hamlet in New York. The Difference supra note 76. 
 87. See Farbman & Grossman, supra note 63. 
 88. The numbers are even more stark if you remove escapes from the equation. Alleged fugitives 
without lawyers were marginally more likely to escape than those with lawyers (23.3 percent vs 16.8 
percent). But many escapes occurred early enough in the process that no lawyer could reasonably have 
gotten involved; therefore, removing escapes allows a fuller picture of the effect that lawyers had on 
case outcomes. Those alleged fugitives with lawyers were much more likely to be exonerated or have 
their freedom purchased than those without (30.8 percent vs. 5.8 percent). 
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it contributed to the escape plan, and sometimes it created enough public pressure 
to convince a judge or commissioner to conclude that an alleged fugitive was 
free. 
It is no secret that resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law was widespread and 
passionate. Nor is there any doubt that abolitionists fought for the freedom of the 
individual alleged fugitives who were threatened with rendition to slavery. But 
a consequence of reliance on Campbell’s data has been that those specific 
individualized campaigns for freedom have been thought to be largely futile. The 
stories of Thomas Sims, Anthony Burns, and Margaret Garner (all sent back to 
slavery despite powerful grassroots resistance) have become symbols for the 
enforcement of the Law rather than the stories of Shadrach Minkins (escaped), 
Stephen Bennett (freedom purchased), or Rosetta Armstead (exonerated). 
The truth is that while those resisting the Law were fighting an uphill battle, 
they were not powerless. The most important support for alleged fugitives came 
from abolitionist activists at the grassroots level. In many Northern cities, an 
alliance of free black citizens and white abolitionists combined support for 
fugitives through the Underground Railroad with support for alleged fugitives 
threatened with being sent back to slavery. These abolitionist activists included 
a small but dedicated cohort of abolitionist lawyers who stood ready to protect 
alleged fugitives when the need arose. It was this collaboration between activists 
and lawyers and their work resisting the Law and its operation that accounted for 
most of the successes achieved by opponents of the Law.89 
 
 89. There was one area where the story about lawyers emerged less clearly in the data. My 
research shows that alleged fugitives without lawyers were marginally more likely to escape from 
federal custody than those with lawyers. (Twenty-three percent of those without lawyers escaped or 
were rescued, while only seventeen percent of those with lawyers escaped or were rescued.) A closer 
look at the cases, however, reveals that escapes and rescues without lawyers look very different than 
those with lawyers. Almost all of the rescues and escapes that occurred without lawyers took place 
within the first brief instances of the federal process before a lawyer could reasonably get involved in 
the case. Typically, a Southern planter would come North and get a warrant from the commissioner for 
the arrest of an alleged fugitive. The commissioner would then pass this warrant on to a federal marshal 
who would set out to find and arrest the alleged fugitive. The alleged fugitive would then see the marshal 
coming (or hear that the marshal was coming) and escape either just before, during, or just after arrest. 
Indeed, these were the escapes that would seem to have been “easiest” because the alleged fugitive was 
escaping before she was put in jail or brought before the commissioner. It is thus not surprising that 
slightly more of these escapes occurred without lawyers—what is perhaps more surprising is that so 
many alleged fugitives with lawyers wound up escaping. 
  Just two of many examples of this scenario are the cases of John Jackson in Boston and 
Eliza in Chicago. A warrant for Jackson’s arrest was issued by Commissioner Woodbury in Boston in 
January 1855. The marshal went to arrest Jackson, but he escaped before the marshal arrived. See 
Fugitive Slave Case in Boston, HERALD OF FREEDOM (WILMINGTON, OH), Jan. 5, 1855, A6. In Eliza’s 
case in 1860, the commissioner in Chicago issued a warrant and she was arrested by the marshal and 
brought to the city jail. After an uproar, a mob of abolitionists (complicit with sympathetic police 
officers) broke her out of jail and helped her on her way to Canada. See The Fugitive Slave Case at 
Chicago: Further Particulars, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 1860, at A1. To bring home the contrast between 
these escapes and those where a lawyer was involved, compare these stories with the stories of Shadrach 
and Lewis. Infra Part II.B. 
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All of this goes to making two relatively straightforward points. First, more 
alleged fugitives than we have previously thought ended their entanglement with 
the processes of the 1850 Law as free persons. Second, one powerful reason for 
this outcome is that lawyers were surprisingly effective in their efforts to protect 
their clients and resist the Fugitive Slave Law. The critical observation is not that 
lawyers were the primary heroes of the story, but that they were active and 
powerful partners in the political resistance to the Law and that without their 
resistance within the process of the Law, the good outcomes that this data reveal 
would not have been possible. 
B. Resistance Lawyering in Practice 
Having recognized the effectiveness of lawyers as seen from a distance, the 
next step is to look more closely at the cases to understand precisely how lawyers 
worked to resist the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and how that 
work fits into the broader work of political resistance. This requires a turn away 
from the quantitative broad view toward a more qualitative and descriptive 
account of the stories behind these numbers.90 
Although the cases had different outcomes, the work that the lawyers did 
in each was remarkably similar. Where detailed records of the lawyering and 
legal strategy exist, that strategy looks much the same whether the alleged 
fugitive was exonerated by the commissioner, escaped, or was sent back to 
slavery. Lawyers used delay, procedural entanglement, and building public 
attention as strategies in nearly every case. Usually, these strategies served the 
dual purpose of increasing their clients’ chances of freedom and rallying public 
support against slavery and the 1850 Law. What emerges from each of these 
stories is a picture of abolitionist lawyers using every tool within reach to fight 
the Law of 1850 (and, by proxy, slavery more broadly). 
1. Escape 
The lawyers who resisted the 1850 Law through delay, confusion, and 
obstruction created opportunity. Delay was valuable in and of itself because 
every day that an alleged fugitive remained in the North was a day that their 
families could visit them and a day that they were preserved from the 
consequences of returning to the plantation as an example for other slaves who 
 
 90. I should acknowledge that I am not the first to consider these cases. Many scholars have 
done important and thorough work unearthing the details of these and other cases arising under the 1850 
Law. See, e.g., BARKER, FUGITIVE SLAVES AND THE UNFINISHED AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EIGHT 
CASES, 1848–1856 (2013); BLACKETT, THE CAPTIVE’S QUEST FOR FREEDOM, supra note 47; LUBET, 
FUGITIVE JUSTICE, supra note 73; MARIE DELOMBARD, SLAVERY ON TRIAL: LAW ABOLITIONISM, 
AND PRINT CULTURE (2007); SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE, supra note 3. The reason to tell these stories 
in detail is not to uncover them as “new” narratives, but rather to place the focus where it has not 
previously been—namely, on a set of resistance strategies used by lawyers that spanned time, 
geography, and outcomes. 
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might think of escaping.91 Delay could help build the political pressure that might 
result in exoneration and could certainly help allies organize to purchase an 
alleged fugitive’s freedom. Delay could also facilitate escape. 
In many instances where alleged fugitives escaped or were rescued, lawyers 
were instrumental in creating the opportunity for escape by resisting the Law 
through the now-familiar means of delay and confusion. Delay gave time for 
vigilance committees92 of militant abolitionists to plot escape plans. Even in the 
absence of such organized scheming, delay simply created more chances for 
opportunistic escape. The following two examples from Boston and Cincinnati 
illustrate the extent to which lawyers and resistance lawyering could become 
instrumental in escape. 
a. Shadrach Minkins 
In 1850, Shadrach Minkins escaped from the service of John DeBree likely 
by stowing away on a boat bound North from Norfolk, Virginia.93 Minkins made 
his way to Boston, where he found work as a waiter in the Cornhill Coffee 
House.94 When the new law was passed in the fall of 1850, DeBree hired a slave 
catcher named John Caphart to come to Boston and bring Minkins back to 
Virginia. Caphart brought a certificate with him from Norfolk and presented it 
to Commissioner George Curtis, who issued a warrant for Shadrach’s arrest in 
February of 1851.95 
On the morning of Saturday, February 15, a federal marshal executed the 
warrant, pretending to be a customer and then arresting Minkins while he waited 
 
 91. One gruesome example of this is Anthony Burns. Once returned to the South, Burns was 
placed in brutal solitary confinement, manacled hand and foot with very little to eat and only dirty water 
to drink. He was not allowed to speak to any other slaves in the prison where he was confined lest he 
pass along the “taint of freedom” to them. To make matters worse, he would be brought out for any 
curious Southern gentleman to observe his torture and to curse him. See CHARLES EMERY STEVENS, 
ANTHONY BURNS: A HISTORY 188–90 (1856). After that punishment, Burns was ultimately purchased 
by allies in Boston and even he, most famous of the condemned fugitive slaves, ended his story as a free 
man. See VON FRANK, supra note 84, at 290–91. 
 92. A vigilance committee was a gathering of private citizens for the purpose of protecting the 
community. In the North, antislavery vigilance committees were organized to protect alleged fugitive 
slaves. See Gary Collison, The Boston Vigilance Committee: A Reconsideration, 12 HIST. J. MASS. 104 
(1984). Vigilance committees were also organized in the South to protect the citizenry from the 
dangerous influence of abolitionists and antislavery politics. See, e.g., MANISHA SINHA, THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SLAVERY: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 
211–212 (2003). 
 93. See BARKER, supra note 90 at 42–43. 
 94. “Coffee House” is actually a somewhat misleading name. A menu from the Cornhill Coffee 
House shows that it was, in fact, a fancy restaurant offering a selection of roast game including: Mongrel 
Goose, four varieties of duck, grouse, and woodcock. For dessert, you could order a floating island, 
Charlotte Rouse, or Calf’s Foot Jelly. See Young’s Cornhill Coffee House Menu- 1853, BOSTON 
ATHENÆUM (1835), http://cdm.bostonathenaeum.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16057coll18/id/8 
[https://perma.cc/PK2R-QEC3]. 
 95. Arrest of a Man in Boston as a Slave–Rescue of the Prisoner, LIBERATOR, Feb. 21, 1851, at 
A2. 
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on him for breakfast.96 The officers whisked Minkins to the courtroom in the 
hopes of a swift and quiet hearing before the commissioner. Fortunately for 
Minkins, the group was spotted crossing the street by some abolitionist activists 
who spread the alarm.97 Boston’s active antislavery community had already 
spotted Caphart in the city. Posters describing him by way of warning had been 
posted around the city,98 and the Boston Vigilance Committee had assigned 
someone to follow the slave catcher through the streets.99 By the time that 
Minkins arrived in the courtroom before Commissioner Curtis, a large crowd of 
abolitionist protestors, many of them black women, had gathered at the 
courthouse.100 The activists had ensured that when Minkins walked into court, 
five of the leading abolitionist lawyers in Boston were there to meet him.101 
DeBree’s lawyer was Seth Thomas (a frequent defender of slave owners in 
Boston). Thomas argued that he was ready to try the case and that “as the 
proceedings were to be summary, he urged that the hearing should proceed at 
once.”102 Minkins’s lawyers immediately sought delay, arguing that they had just 
met their client and had had no chance to prepare their case.103 One look outside 
the courtroom would have been enough for Commissioner Curtis to know that 
the case was now in the public eye and that he risked serious political backlash 
if he rammed the hearing through without offering Minkins a chance to defend 
himself. Curtis was a stout moderate and defender of the Fugitive Slave Law, but 
he was also politically ambitious and sensitive to public perception,104 so he 
agreed to continue the hearing until Tuesday, February 18.105 
In this moment alone, the power of lawyers working together with an 
organized and vigilant community to oppose the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was 
evident. Remember that the Law was intended to create a summary process 
where owners could reclaim their “property” with federal assistance, requiring 
only minimal proof. One reason to create such a summary process was to avoid 
the political complications of public attention and resistance. There was no 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 409. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See SINHA, supra note 3, at 507. 
 100. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 409. 
 101. Arrest of a Man in Boston as a Slave, supra note 95. These were Samuel Sewall, Ellis Gray 
Loring, Charles List, Richard Henry Dana, and Robert Morris. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Curtis was an ally of Daniel Webster and the “Cotton Whigs,” who had been the primary 
brokers of the compromise that led to the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Although he was 
only a lowly commissioner, it was understood that he could raise his profile and advance his political 
career by navigating the crisis successfully. See GARY LEE COLLISON, SHADRACH MINKINS: FROM 
FUGITIVE SLAVE TO CITIZEN 119 (2009). Curtis’ legal career would have a fascinating coda that 
reflected the changing politics of moderates in the North over the 1850s. In 1856 he was one of the 
lawyers who represented Dred Scott before the Supreme Court. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERICA 
IN 1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 86 (1992). 
 105. Arrest of a Man in Boston as a Slave, supra note 95. 
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prohibition against alleged fugitives being represented by lawyers, but it was 
fairly clear that the Law did not anticipate a robust legal process. By claiming 
more process than was intended, the abolitionist lawyers were undermining the 
very purposes of the Law itself. 
Having gotten this extra time, Minkins’s lawyers sought more. They asked 
that DeBree’s documentation be read aloud to them and Curtis agreed. This was 
a slow process.106 All the while, directed by the vigilance committee and 
networks of black activists, antislavery advocates were gathering in an 
increasingly imposing mob inside and outside the courtroom.107 In addition to 
this explicit show of public pressure, by the time the reading was done and the 
court adjourned, a new problem had emerged: there was no place to put Minkins 
for the three days until his hearing. The city of Boston and the state of 
Massachusetts refused to allow the federal government to use their jails, and 
there was no federal jail in the city. Stuck with no other conventional options, it 
appeared that Minkins would have to be housed in the courtroom itself for the 
night.108 
The federal marshal now faced a logistical problem. He had only a few men 
to hold Minkins in the courtroom, and Minkins had five lawyers and some 
friendly members of the press with him, along with a growing mob of antislavery 
advocates in the hallways outside the courtroom and in the streets. Deputy 
Marshal Riley tried to clear the courtroom to no avail. Minkins’s lawyers 
lingered with him discussing his case. Just as they were finally filing out of the 
courtroom, a group of activists from the hallway broke down the door and 
ushered Minkins out of the courtroom and out of federal custody. The 
commissioner and marshals were overwhelmed and were forced to watch 
helplessly as Minkins made his way into the street and eventual freedom.109 
In the aftermath of Minkins’s rescue, much was (and has continued to be) 
made of the question of whether his lawyers were active conspirators in the plan 
to help him escape. Robert Morris (one of the first black attorneys in the United 
States), one of Minkins’s lawyers, was charged with conspiracy. Morris and all 
of his co-counsel disavowed any role in the rescue, but among historians the 
question of whether he did collaborate remains very much open.110 Whether or 
not Morris or Minkins’s other lawyers were explicitly complicit in his escape, 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Statement of Deputy Marshal Riley, LIBERATOR (Boston, MA), Feb. 21, 1851, at A2. 
Riley testified that he was so concerned about the mob that he wrote to Boston’s city marshal to request 
backup—a request that was not met. 
 108. Arrest of a Man in Boston as a Slave, supra note 95. 
 109. Id. After a few stops at safe houses, Minkins made his way to Fitchburg and then on to 
Montreal by train, where he opened his own restaurant. For more detail on the aftermath of the escape 
and the reverberations of the Minkins story in Boston, see COLLISON, supra note 104. 
 110. For a thorough discussion of Morris’s involvement and trial and the ongoing debate around 
his role in the rescue, see Laurel Davis & Mary Sarah Bilder, The Library of Robert Morris, Civil Rights 
Lawyer & Activist, 57–61 (June 21, 2018) (Boston College Law School faculty paper), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/1154 [https://perma.cc/26D4-NXH3]. 
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what is clear in retrospect is that their lawyering strategy worked hand in glove 
with the antislavery activists to facilitate Minkins’s freedom. From the very 
beginning of the proceedings, Minkins’s lawyers sought to buy time. They won 
their motion for a continuance and then managed to delay the court proceedings 
even further into the afternoon while the documentation was read. Having seen 
the power of public uproar to protect fugitive slaves since the passing of the Law, 
they must have known that the antislavery forces in the city would be gathering 
their strength and that every minute of delay in the proceedings would mean 
more political pressure and more opportunities for freedom.111 As the lawyers 
slowed down the workings of the Law, Minkins’s rescuers used the time and 
opportunities that the lawyers had helped to create to ultimately rescue him. As 
much as Minkins’s lawyers might disavow their role in the rescue, none of them 
would have been displeased with the outcome. 
b. Lewis 
In 1850, a man named Lewis escaped from the service of Alexander 
Marshall in Fleming County, Kentucky. Lewis crossed the Ohio River into 
Cincinnati and continued onward to settle outside Columbus.112 In the fall of 
1853, Marshall tracked Lewis to where he was living and managed to get a 
warrant for his arrest. Federal Marshal Dryden of Cincinnati made the arrest and 
brought Lewis to Cincinnati by train to be tried before Commissioner 
Carpenter.113 Even before Lewis arrived in Cincinnati, his lawyers were on the 
case. Activists in Columbus had spotted the arrest and telegraphed their allies in 
Cincinnati to warn them that Lewis was on his way. By the time that Lewis’s 
train arrived, John Jolliffe, a lawyer, and Levi Coffin, the most prominent 
abolitionist in the city, had managed to convince the sheriff in Cincinnati to arrest 
Marshall for kidnapping.114 The slaveholder was quickly freed, but the first salvo 
of resistance lawyering had been fired. Jolliffe surely never thought that he could 
succeed in keeping Marshall in prison on a state charge of kidnapping, but 
because he was able to convince a friendly local sheriff to arrest him, he managed 
to achieve a first measure of delay before the case even began. 
At the hearing, Jolliffe partnered with young antislavery lawyer and future 
president Rutherford B. Hayes. They were lucky that Commissioner Carpenter 
 
 111. For example, Morris and his co-counsel would certainly have been aware that the city had 
been in an uproar just months earlier over the escape of William and Ellen Craft. With the help of an 
engaged antislavery community, the Crafts had escaped the reach of a warrant under the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850. Their escape was considered a victory for the abolitionists and a stinging defeat to the 
allies of Daniel Webster, who had been a primary architect of the Compromise of 1850. See BLACKETT, 
supra note 47, at 396–408. 
 112. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 245. In the newspaper reports, Lewis’s name is sometimes 
spelled “Louis.” 
 113. Id. 
 114. See LEVI COFFIN, REMINISCENCES OF LEVI COFFIN, THE REPUTED PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 549 (1898). 
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appeared less eager to execute the law quickly than some of his colleagues in 
other cities. Jolliffe and Hayes asked that the case be given a full hearing and 
Carpenter agreed to give Lewis substantially more than the summary process 
contemplated by the1850 Law.115 Jolliffe and Hayes made use of this extra time, 
making an elaborate argument that Lewis was free under Ohio law because his 
master had given him permission to enter the state before he escaped—and thus 
(because he had not technically escaped) that he was not a fugitive under the 
meaning of the 1850 Law. This had not proven to be a winning argument in past 
cases, but Carpenter allowed Lewis’s lawyers to make it fully over several 
days.116 
Over the course of the hearing, the case gathered more and more public 
attention. When the day came for Carpenter to announce his decision, a large 
crowd had gathered both inside and outside the courtroom.117 Even before 
Carpenter decided the case, Lewis’s lawyers tried one more gambit to delay the 
proceedings, announcing that they had just received word from Columbus that 
there was further exculpatory evidence in the case and asking for a continuance 
to consider that evidence.118 While Carpenter was considering this request and 
beginning to deliver his conclusions on the case more broadly, the entire 
courtroom’s attention was focused on him.119 He was “slow and tedious in 
reviewing the evidence, and [] he spoke in a low tone.” As a result, “the auditors 
were anxious to hear [and] they leaned forward much absorbed, trying to catch 
every word.”120 
While the room (including the lawyers on both sides) was thus distracted, 
Lewis slipped his chair back a little bit to make space for himself. Noticing that 
 
 115. See BLACKETT, supra note 47, at 245. Blackett suggests that the reason that Carpenter 
granted this request was that he was either partial to Lewis or intimidated by the mob of antislavery 
activists that had gathered. Levi Coffin suggests another possible reason: Carpenter was, in reality, an 
opponent of the law. When Coffin asked Carpenter what he would have done at the conclusion of 
Lewis’s case had he not escaped, he answered that he would have decided that he did not have the power 
to send Lewis back to slavery. Indeed, in June of 1854, Carpenter resigned his office as commissioner 
and wrote an editorial explaining why he felt like he could not serve in the post. See COFFIN, supra note 
114, at 554. 
 116. See COFFIN, supra note 114, at 549. 
 117. The free black community of Cincinnati was one of the most vibrant and active hotbeds of 
antislavery politics in the nation. The antislavery activists in the community and the small but dedicated 
antislavery bar worked together in an integrated and consistent way. See NIKKI MARIE TAYLOR, 
FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI’S BLACK COMMUNITY, 1802–1868, at 160 (2005). 
 118. See A Fugitive Settling His Own Case, ANTI-SLAVERY BUGLE (Lisbon, Ohio), Nov. 5, 
1853, at A1. 
 119. The Anti-Slavery Bugle’s story suggests that Carpenter announced in court that he did not 
think that he had authority to decide the case because the Fugitive Slave Law gave unconstitutional 
judicial powers to commissioners (this was a stock argument that antislavery advocates levied against 
the law). Carpenter reportedly was inclined to wait for Lewis’s lawyers to file a petition for habeas 
corpus to have the case heard by a federal judge. See id. Other accounts of the case report, along with 
Coffin, that Carpenter never actually announced his conclusions in the case at all. See COFFIN, supra 
note 114, at 550–51. 
 120. COFFIN, supra note 114, at 550. 
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nobody took note of him moving his chair, he did it again until he was behind 
the marshal and almost in among the crowd. Still no one noticed his movements, 
so he quietly stood up and stepped backwards. An ally in the crowd gave him a 
nudge of encouragement and someone put a hat on his head. Then, while 
Carpenter droned on, Lewis quietly walked right out of the courtroom and 
mingled among the crowd of free black activists who had gathered to observe 
the hearing.121 From there, Lewis found his way to the street and then to a safe 
house, where he was effectively hidden by abolitionist allies for a few weeks 
before making his way to Canada and freedom.122 
Jolliffe and Hayes were adamant that they had no part in planning Lewis’s 
escape,123 and there is no evidence to contradict their claims. Lewis’s escape 
appeared to be opportunistic rather than premeditated. Even so, once again, it 
was the lawyers who were instrumental in creating the conditions under which 
escape was possible. Remember that Lewis was, like so many other fugitives, on 
a fast track to being sent back to slavery. From getting Lewis’s captors arrested 
at the train station to extending the hearing before Commissioner Carpenter, 
Lewis’s lawyers used strategies of delay and procedural confusion to buy Lewis 
time and raise the public salience of his trial. When the opportunity came for him 
to escape, it was amid the legal process that his lawyers had helped extend, and 
it was accomplished with the help of the engaged activists who had been on alert 
throughout the trial. 
2. Purchased Freedom 
If lawyering could be instrumental in facilitating escape, the role of 
resistance lawyering was even clearer in cases where an alleged fugitive was 
rescued from slavery by having her freedom purchased. In order to mobilize the 
funds necessary to pay for purchase, activists needed a combination of time and 
public awareness. The more prominent the case, and the longer it was in the 
public eye, the better the chances that friends of the alleged fugitive would have 
time and opportunity to pass the hat to collect the funds necessary to buy her 
freedom. 
 
 121. Id. Coffin claims to have personally observed the entire scene in detail. 
 122. Coffin tells a potboiler of a story about Lewis’s evasion of the marshal and his master. 
Apparently Coffin and some allies dressed Lewis in women’s clothing and smuggled him into the house 
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 123. A Fugitive Settling His Own Case, supra note 118. 
1912 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:1877 
That said, most instances of purchased freedom took place within the first 
fifteen months that the Law was on the books.124 This is true for two primary 
reasons. First, slave owners became reluctant to accept offers to purchase an 
alleged fugitive’s freedom as the sectional battle lines around the Law hardened. 
For instance, in the case of Margaret Garner, the man who claimed to own her 
and her family refused any purchase offers, preferring to bring his prize home 
and make an example of her for his other slaves and for the South more 
broadly.125 Second, alongside the owners’ reluctance, a subset of abolitionists 
also opposed efforts to purchase an alleged fugitive’s freedom on the grounds 
that it amounted to an immoral acceptance of the legitimacy of the owner’s claim 
and participation in the economy of slavery. For example, when Wash McQuarry 
was being tried in Cincinnati, a movement was initiated to purchase his 
freedom.126 But prominent white abolitionists disagreed over whether it was 
appropriate to participate in the economy of slavery.127 It is likely that this 
disagreement crippled the effort and McQuerry’s allies were unable to raise 
enough money to meet his owner’s asking price.128 
While the attitude of the slave owners is entirely consistent with the 
hardening of proslavery politics over the course of the 1850s, the hardline 
position taken by men like Brisbane can be harder to understand. Men like 
Brisbane considered any participation in the market created by slavery to be an 
enabling endorsement of that system. Therefore, purchasing the freedom of an 
alleged slave not only enriched the slave owner, it also entrenched the very 
system they were trying to dismantle.129 For the purposes of this Section, it is 
enough to acknowledge that the successful purchases of alleged slaves’ freedom 
were most common in the early days of resisting the Fugitive Slave Law. 
However, this fact makes them no less interesting as an example of the strategies 
used by lawyers resisting the Law in service of freedom by any means. 
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a. Stephen Bennett 
Stephen Bennett was alleged to have escaped from Captain Edward B. 
Gallup of Baltimore in July of 1847. Bennett made his way to Philadelphia, 
where he lived with his wife and child.130 In January of 1851, Gallup applied to 
Commissioner Ingraham in Philadelphia, seeking a warrant for the arrest of 
Bennett. Ingraham granted the warrant and deputized a local officer to make the 
arrest and deliver Bennett to the marshal in Philadelphia.131 Bennett was arrested 
on Thursday, January 23, and brought to the city to await his hearing.132 
The abolitionist community in Philadelphia took immediate action. When 
Bennett arrived before Commissioner Ingraham on Thursday at 10 a.m., William 
S. Pierce, the first lawyer on the scene, presented a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.133 Ingraham granted the writ and 
continued the case until the next morning.134 An extra day was more than enough 
for the activists in the free black community of Philadelphia to take action. They 
marched down to the jail and demanded (without success) that Bennett be 
released.135 
By the next morning, the case had become widely known in the city.136 At 
10 a.m., Bennett’s lawyers (Pierce and Elwood Evans) filed for another 
continuance to allow time for David Paul Brown, the dean of the Philadelphia 
antislavery bar, to come and serve as counsel for Bennett. Ingraham granted a 
brief delay.137 At 11 a.m., Bennett’s lawyers produced another form of delay by 
filing a habeas petition before Judge John K. Kane in the federal district court. 
Recognizing that this case had caught the public eye and wanting to ensure that 
the outcome would be seen as legitimate, Kane granted the writ and transferred 
the case to his courtroom.138 It is very unlikely that Kane took the case to help 
Bennett; he was no abolitionist. Rather, he was an avid Jacksonian Democrat, 
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and just four years later would author one of the most notorious proslavery 
opinions of the 1850s in the case of Passmore Williamson.139 
The counsel for Gallup was a man named McMurtrie, a lawyer notorious 
for representing slave owners in proceedings under the 1850 Law.140 McMurtrie 
protested that the case had been begun before Commissioner Ingraham and 
should not be transferred. Kane demurred, holding that he had jurisdiction and 
that he should hear the evidence de novo.141 It was now noon, and Pierce 
announced to Judge Kane that Brown would not, after all, be able to make an 
appearance in the case. Consequently, Pierce asked for yet another continuance 
to confer with his client. This too was granted.142 It was now midafternoon on 
Friday and Bennett’s lawyers had succeeded in delaying the hearing long enough 
for the antislavery organizers to bring a pro-Bennett crowd to gather outside the 
courtroom. 
Once the case commenced, things did not look good for Bennett. Pierce and 
Evans argued that Bennett had been voluntarily sent to Pennsylvania while in 
Gallup’s service and that these trips had rendered him free under state law. As a 
result, they argued, he could not be considered a fugitive. They did not dispute 
Bennett’s identity. Kane ruled that there was no dispute that Bennett was indeed 
a fugitive and that his previous trips to the state had not made him free. At the 
end of the hearing on Friday, Kane ordered the marshal to return Bennett to 
Gallup and to Baltimore.143 
Bennett had lost in the courtroom, but he would not return to slavery. The 
allies that had gathered around him had collected the funds to purchase his 
freedom for $350.144 Not only was the opportunity to purchase Bennett’s 
freedom a victory for the activists and lawyers that rallied to support him, so too 
was the price. Slaves were among the most valuable commodities in the country 
in the 1850s, and other persons who had their freedom purchased were sold at a 
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much higher price.145 Although Bennett’s lawyers had been able to buy him only 
a little bit more time, they had done everything they could in a case that they 
knew that they would surely lose. Without knowing whether William Pierce, 
Elwood Evans, or even David Paul Brown contributed to the fund to purchase 
Bennett’s freedom, their lawyering within the law to slow down the machinery 
of returning Bennett to slavery was instrumental to his ending up free. 
b. Horace Preston 
A year later, in New York City, Horace Preston’s case showed that 
proslavery forces were learning to push back against the tactics of abolitionist 
resistance lawyers. Preston lived in Williamsburg in Brooklyn with his wife and 
children. In April of 1852, a local police officer named Martin received a tip 
from a man claiming to be Preston’s master that Preston was a fugitive slave 
from Baltimore.146 Acting on this tip, Martin arrested Preston on a specious 
charge of petty theft and brought him to the city jail in New York (“the tombs”). 
Martin then notified Busteed, the lawyer for Preston’s alleged owners, who 
contacted Reese, the alleged owner’s son. Reese rushed to New York by train 
and, together with Busteed, went to visit Preston in jail.147 By the next morning, 
Busteed and Reese had gone to Commissioner Morton and commenced process 
against Preston under the Fugitive Slave Law. 
Busteed and Commissioner Morton had learned from past cases and were 
clearly motivated to avoid the intervention and delay that lawyers created. Reese 
and Busteed had gone to great lengths to hide Preston’s location from his wife 
and the abolitionist attorneys that were trying to help him. By the time Preston’s 
supporters and legal team finally found him, the case before Commissioner 
Morton had already begun.148 
Preston’s two lawyers were Erastus D. Culver and John Jay, both mainstays 
of the abolitionist bar in New York.149 Once they found Preston and saw that 
Busteed had already called his first witnesses, they proceeded to cross-examine 
those witnesses as best they could and extended cross-examination as long as 
possible, successfully lobbying a reluctant Commissioner Morton to recall 
Busteed’s witnesses so that they could question them further.150 After dragging 
the process out as long as they could, Culver and Jay asked that the case be 
adjourned until the next day to give them time to confer with their client and 
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gather some semblance of a case. Morton was reluctant to extend the hearing, 
and Busteed was indignant. Culver and Jay accused both Busteed and Morton of 
attempting to hold the hearing in secret in order to send Preston off without any 
process. Jay acidly said that “it would be no doubt pleasant to Mr. Busteed to 
ship the man off by the 5 o’clock train.”151 Reluctantly, Morton relented and 
adjourned the hearing until the next morning.152 
Short though the respite was, for Preston it meant the difference between 
being immediately returned to slavery and one more night with his family.153 
This alone made the delay a small victory, but it also bought time for Preston’s 
allies to raise the salience of the case and begin to organize an effort to free him. 
When the hearing reconvened the next morning, Preston’s lawyers did 
everything they could to slow down the gears of the process—even provoking 
violence in the courtroom and then trying to take advantage of it.154 Jay’s first 
move was to call Busteed to the stand and question him about his role in planning 
and executing Preston’s arrest. Busteed refused to answer these inquiries and 
Commissioner Morton refused to order him to answer. Jay then angrily accused 
Busteed of being a “rank perjurer.”155 Busteed responded by jumping out of the 
witness stand and “[striking] Jay a violent slap on the left side of the head.”156 
Preston’s lawyers immediately sought to take advantage of this breach of 
decorum by demanding that the case be transferred to Judge Betts of the district 
court.157 Betts refused to take the case,158 and the opportunity passed, but the 
moment provides a nice illustration of Preston’s lawyers’ commitment to delay 
and procedural confusion. Literally reeling, Jay immediately sought to use 
Busteed’s disruption to create more time and space for the case. 
After the hubbub, Jay moved to dismiss the case for lack of evidence, 
arguing that no bill of sale had been produced. Morton adjourned, saying he 
would take the papers home with him and decide the next day.159 Preston’s 
lawyers appeared to believe that Morton would decide the motion the next day, 
after which they would commence their own case. They had assembled a few 
witnesses who were at the courtroom the next morning (Saturday) in the 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. Upon adjournment some interesting jockeying occurred between the lawyers. Busteed 
challenged Jay to match his own contribution to a fund for purchasing Preston’s freedom. Jay and Culver 
dismissed this challenge as hypocritical grandstanding. Culver remarked that he thought it was “wind 
myself, do the dirty work and then turn round and make a great offer.” Id. This building tension between 
the lawyers would come dramatically to the surface the next day. 
 153. See id. (The Tribune reporting that when Commissioner Morton adjourned the hearing, 
Preston’s wife “in much grief, approached to where he sat, kneeled down in front of him and gave way 
to her lamentation”). 
 154. See United States Commissioner’s Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1852, at A1. While Jay was 
still representing Preston, it appears that Culver had been replaced by a lawyer named Emmett. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
2019] RESISTANCE LAWYERING 1917 
expectation that they would have the opportunity to present their case.160 
Commissioner Morton had other ideas. He came into the courtroom on Saturday 
morning ready with his decision not only on the motion, but on the case as a 
whole. Before his lawyers knew it, Morton had signed the certificate and 
delivered Preston over to the marshal to be returned to Baltimore.161 Preston’s 
lawyers filed a last-ditch habeas petition to Judge Judson of the state court, but 
it came to nothing and Preston was brought back to Baltimore.162 
It would seem, then, that Preston’s case was lost and that all his lawyers’ 
efforts were for naught.163 But there was one more chapter. Because Preston’s 
lawyers had stretched the case out over three days, it received extensive news 
coverage in the daily papers, raising public awareness. The case piqued interest 
and titillated readers: an alleged fugitive slave, lawyers insulting each other, even 
a fistfight. Thus, when Morton abruptly ended the hearing and sent Preston back 
to slavery, his lawyers, in concert with the abolitionist organizers in the city, had 
an audience for their outrage. Indeed, they continued their advocacy after the 
case ended, publishing a “card” detailing their involvement with the case and 
complaining that Morton had terminated the hearing without allowing Preston’s 
case to be heard.164 This card was the first volley in a broad effort to gather the 
$1500 that Reese demanded to purchase Preston’s freedom.165 Newspapers 
across New York, both the city and the state, published notices advertising the 
collection of funds.166 A little over a month later, the money had been gathered 
and Preston returned to New York and his family, a free man.167 
Preston’s return was more complicated than Bennett’s. Although Preston’s 
lawyers took every opportunity they could to slow down the system, 
Commissioner Morton was a more savvy and determined opponent than 
Ingraham had been. The result was that Preston had to endure the indignity of 
being marched out of the city in chains and returned to slavery for a horrific 
month. Still, the fact that Preston ended up free at all is likely due in part to his 
lawyers’ efforts. Not only did they do everything they could to create time and 
space for delay and entanglement, they also continued their advocacy for him 
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after the case was over. They used the outrage over Morton’s high-handedness 
both to build public opposition to the Law and to collect the funds to bring 
Preston home. 
3. Exoneration 
The most obvious way that lawyers helped alleged fugitives end up free 
was by exonerating them under the terms of the 1850 Law. Exonerations might 
seem to fit awkwardly into a picture of resistance lawyering because, in theory, 
an exoneration should be evidence of the law’s process working properly. Justice 
is “working” when an alleged fugitive protests that she is not a slave and the 
commissioner, or judge, agrees and grants her freedom. In fact, however, 
exonerations were as much the product of strategies of resistance lawyering as 
were escape or purchased freedom. Abolitionist lawyers achieved exonerations 
not by pleading their cases to disinterested and just tribunals, but rather by 
putting political and moral pressure on commissioners and judges and by keeping 
that pressure applied through strategies of delay, procedural obfuscation, and 
public spectacle. These lawyers could not know in advance whether their 
arguments for exoneration would be persuasive, so they adopted the strategies of 
resistance to maximize the chances for a good outcome of any variety. 
a. Tamor Williams 
In February of 1851 William T. Purnell of Worcester County, Maryland 
came to Philadelphia looking for a woman named Mahala who he claimed had 
escaped from his service in 1828.168 The woman who he claimed was Mahala 
went by the name Tamor Williams. She had been living in Philadelphia for years 
and was a longstanding member of a local Methodist church. She had six 
children, one of whom was still a nursing infant.169 
Purnell’s agent, Robert Bowen, claimed that he had learned of Williams’s 
whereabouts by a letter signed by “Louisa Truitt.”170 Truitt was a mysterious 
figure who never appeared at trial. She apparently directed Bowen to meet a man 
on Market Street who would direct Bowen and Purnell to Williams.171 Following 
the procedures set out in the Law of 1850, Purnell and his agents went to the 
offices of Commissioner Edward Ingraham. Ingraham issued a warrant for the 
arrest of Tamor Williams, which was executed on Thursday, February 6.172 
Willams’s arrest caused an uproar in the free black community of 
Philadelphia. As was true in so many of these cases, both the activists and the 
lawyers immediately sprang into action, so that when Williams was brought 
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before the commissioner there were “some thirty or forty colored persons 
present” in the courtroom.173 Not only was the room packed with black allies, 
but Williams was met there by prominent abolitionist lawyer William S. 
Pierce.174 Pierce’s first move was to request delay. He convinced Commissioner 
Ingraham to continue the hearing on Williams’s case until the afternoon, when 
his more famous colleague David Paul Brown could join him.175 
Despite the Law’s clear intention that she receive minimal and summary 
process, Williams found herself surrounded by a battalion of supporters and 
defended by experienced attorneys. Had no one been there to support her, in all 
likelihood Ingraham would have conducted the hearing quickly and, as the Law 
contemplated, sent Williams to Maryland (likely to be sold “down the river” to 
the deep South).176 But, because the community and Pierce were in the 
courtroom, Ingraham granted a continuance until the afternoon. 
The hearing was supposed to reconvene at 4 p.m. before Commissioner 
Ingraham.177 David Paul Brown, in the meantime, wasted no time in filing a 
petition for habeas corpus before Judge Kane, the federal district judge sitting in 
Philadelphia. Faced with public attention and the delicate politics around the law, 
Kane chose to grant the petition for habeas and to hear Williams’s case himself 
in federal court.178 
Kane’s decision caused more chaos favorable to Williams and her lawyers. 
Ingraham had adjourned the hearing until 4 p.m., but when Kane granted the 
habeas petition, he asked that the lawyers report to his courtroom at 1 p.m. to 
address the case.179 Purnell’s lawyer (McMurtrie, the same lawyer who 
represented Bennett’s owner) was confused. He told Judge Kane that he’d sent 
his witnesses off with instructions to return in front of the commissioner at 4 
p.m.. He did not know where they were now. Moreover, he was confused about 
what he was doing in front of a federal judge; he thought the whole proceeding 
was supposed to happen before the commissioner.180 Kane responded that he was 
not quite sure either—“he was new in these matters.”181 Then, because Purnell’s 
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witnesses were not ready, Judge Kane continued the case until the next 
morning.182 
Things went even better for Williams and her lawyers when the trial began 
before Judge Kane the next day. McMurtrie began the Friday morning 
proceedings by presenting his case. He called one witness: Robert Bowen. 
Bowen testified vaguely that he had hired Williams from Purnell for a few years 
before she ran away from his service in 1828.183 On cross-examination, Bowen 
revealed that he and Purnell only knew of Williams’s whereabouts because they 
had been notified by the mysterious Truitt letter. Bowen admitted that they could 
produce neither the letter, nor Truitt, nor the man that Bowen claimed to meet on 
Truitt’s direction who led them to Williams. In the end, Bowen was forced to 
concede that the only proof that Williams had been Purnell’s slave was his 
identification of her more than twenty years after he’d last seen her. Bowen then 
became ill and the hearing was adjourned until the next day (Saturday).184 
On Saturday, McMurtrie continued to make his case, but although much 
was made of the mysterious Truitt letter, Brown and Pierce effectively reduced 
the case to Purnell’s claim that he could identify Williams after more than twenty 
years’ absence.185 When it was Brown and Pierce’s turn to make their case, they 
began by asking for more time. They argued that their evidence would take too 
long to produce and that the court should adjourn until Tuesday morning when 
Judge Kane was available next.186 This request prompted a flurry of dispute from 
McMurtrie. He argued that the case should proceed quickly because his clients 
were “exposed to insult” in the city and had a right to conclude their case quickly. 
Brown responded incredulously, noting that his client faced a much more 
insulting fate should the case go against her.187 
Kane took a short recess but insisted that the case proceed on Saturday 
afternoon. Brown and Pierce called four witnesses from the free black 
community who all testified that they knew Williams and had known her to be 
living in the area since before Purnell claimed that she had run away. One after 
another, they raised doubts about the already flimsy testimony offered by Purnell 
and his team. McMurtrie was on his heels. Backing away from his initial 
confidence, he argued to Kane that he did not have to prove that Williams was 
Purnell’s slave, but rather that there was enough evidence to return her to 
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Maryland, where a state court would decide the question of her freedom. 
Essentially impugning the credibility of the black witnesses examined by Brown 
and Pierce, McMurtrie suggested that the word of his white witnesses was 
sufficient to meet that standard. Kane rejected this argument out of hand, 
although McMurtrie may well have had a good legal case that this was the intent 
of the law.188 
In the end, Judge Kane looked at the evidence and determined that 
Williams’ witnesses were more persuasive. He held that “[t]here could be no 
question but that the weight of the evidence preponderated in favor of the 
prisoner.”189 Williams was set free and whisked away to an impromptu 
abolitionist rally to celebrate the victory.190 
The resolution to Williams’s case affirms the effective partnership that took 
place between abolitionist activists and lawyers. Brown and Pierce could only 
mount a defense because they had achieved a few precious days of delay. They 
used that delay to find witnesses to attack Purnell’s case, but also to build 
political support for Williams and to put pressure on Kane so that he could not 
avoid seeing the salience of the case before him. As Brown concluded his 
arguments in the case, he hurled “burning invective” at Purnell and Bowen, 
describing them as kidnappers and servants of an evil slave regime.191 As well 
as using delay and procedural entanglement, Brown intentionally made the case 
into a public spectacle, which then easily transitioned into a public political rally. 
And so, much though Williams’s case might appear to be a victory for 
traditional “lawyering,” it was as much a product of resistance to the law as it 
was a victory within the law. From the beginning, Brown and Pierce acted to 
undercut the 1850 Law’s primary purpose of summary process and a low 
evidentiary bar for alleged owners. They were happy to ask for as much delay 
and to create as much procedural confusion as possible. So too were they happy 
to politicize the case and turn it into a referendum on slavery. 
b. Rosetta Armstead 
The story of Rosetta Armstead demonstrates many of the same dynamics 
as that of Tamor Williams, superheated by five more years of sectional tension. 
Armstead was a slave claimed by Rev. Henry Denison of Louisville, 
Kentucky.192 Armstead had been serving Denison in Louisville, but when his 
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wife died, he decided to send her to Virginia.193 Denison charged a doctor named 
Miller with bringing Armstead from Louisville to Virginia in March of 1855. 
The easiest and most common route between Kentucky and Virginia was a 
riverboat up the Ohio River to Wheeling, Virginia.194 During the 1850s, this trip 
had become somewhat fraught for slave owners traveling with slaves because 
antislavery activists kept an active watch on riverboats that docked in Ohio. The 
activists helped any slaves that they found into Ohio, where the slaves could 
claim that they had been freed by being brought voluntarily to free soil.195 Courts 
had generally made exceptions for slave owners who were travelling directly on 
the river, but in general those traveling with slaves tried to use boats that docked 
on the Kentucky shore rather than in Ohio to avoid problems. 
Traveling in March, Miller ran into problems in Cincinnati. Because of ice, 
he docked his boat in Cincinnati rather than across the river in Covington, 
Kentucky. Even worse for Miller, the river was not passable beyond Cincinnati, 
forcing him to take the train on to Wheeling, which required a stop in 
Columbus.196 Miller was apparently ignorant of the law in Ohio that threatened 
to free any slave who was brought to the state voluntarily, and so he stopped off 
for the night in Columbus, where Armstead was noticed by the vigilant free black 
community. The activists in Columbus sprang into action and got a lawyer there 
to file a habeas petition for her. Armstead was brought before a friendly state 
probate judge and declared free because she had been brought voluntarily into 
the state and was, therefore, not a fugitive. Because she was still a minor, she 
was appointed a guardian, Van Slyke, and found herself suddenly a free person 
living in Columbus.197 
Note already that the actions taken to protect Armstead were consistent 
with the broader strategies of resistance against the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. 
The foundation for action was the vigilance and quick action of the free black 
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community in Columbus. Activists then called upon lawyers to support their 
efforts by seeking recourse to existing procedural means (here the state habeas 
process). This combination of activist vigilance and lawyering prevented 
Armstead from being whisked out of the state by train and created the possibility 
that she would end up free. 
Upon learning that Armstead was in Columbus, Denison came to the city 
to plead with her to return to his service. When Armstead refused to return to 
slavery, Denison went to Commissioner Pendery in Cincinnati and got a warrant 
for her arrest as a fugitive slave. Armstead was arrested and brought to Cincinnati 
to be tried.198 Here commenced a dizzying flurry of legal maneuvers that would 
end with Rosetta being declared free. 
Even before Armstead arrived in Cincinnati, the wheels were turning there 
to protect her. Her guardian, Van Slyke, had telegraphed abolitionist allies in 
Cincinnati to warn them of what was coming, and a group of lawyers including 
Salmon Chase and Rutherford B. Hayes immediately sprang into action, seeking 
a writ of habeas corpus from Judge Parker, a state court judge on the Court of 
Common Pleas. Parker granted the writ and ordered that the federal marshal, 
H.H. Robinson, turn Armstead over to the sheriff, who would in turn return her 
to the care of Van Slyke.199 
Chase and Hayes were eager to sow confusion by pitting state courts against 
federal courts. By getting Parker to order the marshal to turn Armstead over to 
the sheriff, they orchestrated a standoff between state and federal authorities that 
both slowed down the operation of the law and raised the profile of the case. 
Despite Parker’s order, Marshal Robinson refused to turn Armstead over to the 
sheriff, prompting Parker to hold the marshal and Denison in contempt of court 
and to order Robinson to free Armstead.200 Briefly defeated, Robinson turned 
Armstead over to the sheriff. No sooner had the sheriff brought Armstead to Van 
Slyke, however, than Marshal Robinson appeared at the hotel with a new federal 
warrant from Commissioner Pendery giving him authority to rearrest her. He 
executed the warrant and brought Armstead back into federal custody by force. 
This prompted a second contempt order from Parker.201 
All of this back-and-forth took place before Armstead’s hearing before 
Commissioner Pendery even began. Lawyers and activists had set the stage for 
the commissioner by painting both owner and marshal as criminals and enemies 
of Ohio law. Through delay and procedural obfuscation, the lawyers focused 
public attention on the case and forced Pendery to do more than rubber-stamp 
Denison’s claim. In the end, this pressure worked. Pendery allowed a long and 
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elaborate argument in the case, and while he chided Chase and Hayes for 
deliberately seeking to frustrate the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law, he 
ended up concluding that Armstead was, indeed, free under Ohio law.202 
Armstead was finally set free and returned triumphantly to Columbus to a huge 
crowd celebrating her return.203 
The cases of Tamor Williams and Rosetta Armstead show the tactics of 
resistance lawyering at their most successful within the legal system. Taken 
alone, these cases might suggest that resistance lawyering is no more than savvy, 
zealous advocacy, as lawyers do whatever it takes within the system to achieve 
a positive result. But this misses just how radical their tactics were. Williams’s 
and Armstead’s lawyers were not acting as faithful stewards of a legitimate legal 
system. Instead, they were challenging the core assumptions of that system from 
within. The mere fact that they won does not change the conclusion that they 
were acting as resistance lawyers. It is not hard to imagine that these same tactics 
might have helped set the stage for escape or purchase had the circumstances 
been slightly different. Think, for example, of what might have happened had 
Pendery ordered Rosetta to be returned to Denison. The lawyering and 
organizing had energized a mob that might well have been motivated to free 
Armstead by purchase or by force. Indeed, it was likely that the pressure exerted 
by this mob contributed to Pendery’s choice to depart from his normal summary 
process and avoid a riot by freeing Armstead.204 
4. Returned to Slavery 
The strategies of resistance lawyering used in city after city and case after 
case were surprisingly successful, but they were not only employed in cases with 
happy endings. Lawyers could not know beforehand whether the time and space 
they were creating would be effective. Often, in fact, the strategies of delay and 
confusion became more extreme and overt in cases where the hope of a good 
outcome was smaller. 
One example of this is the case of Thomas Sims, the first alleged fugitive 
to be returned to slavery from Boston. In February of 1851, Sims escaped from 
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James Potter’s rice plantation near Savannah by stowing away on a boat bound 
for Boston.205 In April, he was found in Boston and arrested. In the process of 
resisting arrest, Sims stabbed one of the deputies, Asa Butman.206 Sims’s Case 
came hot on the heels of the Shadrach Minkins rescue, and the federal and city 
authorities were keen to avoid a repeat. They secured the courthouse by literally 
surrounding it with “stout chains,” and hundreds of armed men were engaged to 
prevent against escape.207 The Boston vigilance committee faced a difficult 
challenge. Rescue was going to be difficult given the federal government’s 
fortification of the proceedings, and it was not clear that it would be possible to 
purchase Sims’s freedom.208 
In this context, Sims’s lawyers pulled out all the stops.209 Their first move 
was to seek delay from Commissioner Curtis to allow them to file a motion for 
habeas corpus to the state courts. Curtis granted this delay, much to the dismay 
of Potter and his lawyer, old friend Seth Thomas (who had also represented the 
owner in Shadrach Minkins’s case).210 Sims’s lawyers then filed two motions for 
habeas corpus with the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, Lemuel Shaw. 
Shaw denied both motions, infamously holding that states should not interfere 
with the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law and that the compromise over 
fugitive slaves was essential to the compromise at the heart of the Constitution.211 
Undaunted, Sims’s lawyers persevered and filed a flurry of motions in state 
court intended to slow the process in any way possible. They filed a motion for 
personal replevin against the federal marshal in the hopes of forcing a trial on 
the issue of whether he could legally hold Sims.212 More creatively, they filed a 
criminal suit against Sims for the stabbing of Asa Butman and then argued that 
the state court needed to take jurisdiction because state criminal claims trumped 
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the claims of the 1850 Law.213 When these measures failed, Sims’s lawyers tried 
filing a habeas petition in federal court before Judge Woodbury.214 When this 
too failed, some of the more radical lawyers in the city resorted to attempts to 
arrest Sims’s captors. Richard Hildreth issued an arrest warrant for Potter’s 
agents John Bacon and M.S. D’Lyon, and convinced a friendly sheriff’s deputy 
to execute the warrant. Bacon and D’Lyon were briefly detained.215 All of these 
measures were to no avail, and Commissioner Curtis ruled against Sims, ordering 
that he be returned to Georgia. 
Yet even this final order did not stop the legal process. As Sims was sitting 
on a boat on his way South, Richard Hildreth filed yet another warrant, this time 
a criminal warrant for Sims’s arrest, in a last-ditch attempt to use his assault to 
get him into state custody. When the sheriff declined to act on the warrant, 
Hildreth and his allies put the warrant in the hand of a constable in Boston and a 
friendly deputy sheriff with jurisdiction over Nantucket. These lawmen chartered 
a steamer to chase down Sims’s boat and board it to arrest him, but they got there 
too late; Sims’s boat had beaten them out of the harbor and was well on its way 
back to Georgia.216 
Sims’s case and others like it demonstrated the lengths that radical 
antislavery lawyers were willing to go to stop the 1850 Law from functioning. 
Indeed, as the outcome of the case seemed more and more likely to go against 
Sims, the lawyering strategies became more and more explicitly hostile to the 
restrictions outlined in the 1850 Law. For the most committed resistance lawyers, 
legal process was just one tool among many to keep alleged fugitives from being 
returned to slavery. Even when resistance was at its most radical and extreme, as 
at the end of Sims’s Case, the law was still being used in much the same way: to 
create delay and procedural confusion with the goals of opening up possibilities 
for freedom and building public opposition to slavery. 
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5. A Note on Ethics 
In and among these stories are a set of complex ethical problems that 
abolitionist lawyers faced in the 1850s and that resistance lawyers still face 
today. In addressing these questions, I do not propose to resolve them or to 
absolve the abolitionist lawyers of their ethical mistakes. Rather, I raise these 
issues to engage them as puzzles that structure the way that resistance lawyers 
thought and think about their practice. 
One of the most obvious questions that arose in the case of Shadrach 
Minkins and Lewis was whether lawyers should help their clients escape in the 
face of a legal regime that they consider unjust and illegitimate. For many of us 
in the present day, looking back on slavery, this question seems easy.217 Slavery 
was a great abomination and the moral choice—at least in hindsight—would 
surely be to help anyone facing a return to slavery to escape.218 And yet while 
the lawyers in these stories were occasionally instrumental in creating the 
circumstances under which escape was possible, there is little evidence that any 
lawyer affirmatively facilitated an escape of one of their clients while 
representing them.219 This fact reveals a fascinating dissonance in the practice of 
even the most radical resistance lawyers. For legal process to work as a tool of 
delay and confusion, lawyers could not entirely rupture their relationship to the 
legitimacy of the process. Even if delay and confusion were never intended in 
good faith with the legal system and only intended to obstruct, they were still 
accomplished within the boundaries of legitimate legal practice. For example, 
when Richard Hildreth made his last-ditch attempt to rescue Sims, he wrote out 
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a warrant to have Sims retaken rather than just hiring a ship to retake Sims by 
force. Even at the extreme, Hildreth was acting just within the boundaries of the 
legal system. 
This commitment to legal process even in service of undermining law is 
revealing. Powerful though lawyers were in resisting the law, the true 
revolutionaries looked beyond the courtroom. Levi Coffin and the abolitionists 
who helped Lewis escape felt no conflicts about putting a hat on his head and 
ushering him out the door. The members of the Boston Vigilance Committee felt 
no compunction about organizing a desperate (and perhaps violent) plan to 
rescue Thomas Sims.220 This minimal commitment to the legal system meant 
that lawyers were not the rescuers (except in the case of exonerations), but rather 
operated at a close remove within the system as facilitators. 
Antislavery lawyers also varied significantly in just how committed they 
were to the legal system. Some, like Richard Henry Dana in Boston and David 
Paul Brown in Philadelphia, fought for alleged fugitives to be free, but also 
argued that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and its processes could be legitimate. 
Dana and Brown and lawyers like them opposed slavery personally and believed 
that it could be fought legitimately through the courts. However, when the courts 
ruled, they were inclined to respect those rulings. 
But there were other, more radical lawyers for whom the entire legal 
apparatus of the Law was illegitimate. For these lawyers, no holding by a federal 
commissioner, and perhaps no holding by a federal judge or state judge, could 
be worthy of respect if it returned an alleged fugitive to slavery. It was these 
lawyers, men like John Jolliffe and Richard Hildreth, who pushed the limits of 
resistance lawyering right to the edge of rejecting law altogether. And yet they 
did not go over that edge—they used the tools of legal process to fight their 
battles. In asking for continuances, filing habeas petitions, and issuing specious 
arrest warrants, these lawyers worked within the legal system to fight against a 
discrete legal structure (slavery and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850). They 
remained recognizably lawyers in their commitment to working within the law 
broadly while they fought to change legal systems that they abhorred. 
This position is important to stake out both in the past and the present. It is 
tempting to see resistance lawyering as practiced by these lawyers as almost 
nihilistic—a pure stratagem to achieve a desired outcome. But a closer look 
reveals a deep faith in law and legal process behind even the most outrageous of 
the antislavery lawyers’ attempts to delay and confuse. Resistance lawyering was 
defined by a rejection of a specific system of legal process, but ultimately (and 
necessarily) grounded in a fundamental commitment to legal order more broadly. 
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2019] RESISTANCE LAWYERING 1929 
There is one further ethical problem that is worth noting before turning to 
the present. One of the reasons that antislavery lawyers sought delay was to raise 
the public salience of the case as it was happening. In part this was because 
increased public attention increased the chances that an alleged fugitive would 
end up free through acquittal, purchase, or escape. But increased public attention 
also meant a bully pulpit for antislavery lawyers’ arguments condemning 
slavery. Remember that the fight against the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was an 
important proxy battle in a broader political struggle against slavery as a whole. 
Courtroom speeches were widely reported in the daily papers and legal 
arguments were essential weapons in the rhetorical struggle against slavery.221 
Antislavery lawyers sought to portray their opponents as evil,222 and in 
court they took every opportunity possible to rail against what Jolliffe called the 
“seething Hell of American Slavery.”223 This attack on slavery as an institution 
frequently lined up with their clients’ interests. An alleged fugitive slave came 
to court abhorring slavery and hoping to end up free. Invective against slavery 
tended to build public support for purchase and escape and occasionally (as with 
Carpenter in the Lewis Case) made a commissioner or judge hesitant about 
allying themselves with the slavery and the South. But there were times when 
lawyers’ focus on the broader political problem came into conflict with what we 
would think today might be their clients’ best interests. 
One example of this kind of conflict occurred in the Anthony Burns case. 
Burns was arrested in Boston in 1854. When Burns was first detained and 
brought into court, he did not yet have a lawyer. When he was first approached 
by Richard Henry Dana, Burns was reluctant to “lawyer up.” Burns reportedly 
told Dana, “It is of no use, they have got me.” He—rightfully—worried that if 
he fought the process, he would be punished for it when he got back to 
Virginia.224 It was no secret that slave owners sometimes brutally punished 
returned fugitives, both out of anger and out of a desire to dissuade others from 
trying to escape.225 Burns was prophetic; upon his eventual return to Virginia he 
was indeed subjected to humiliation and torture.226 Dana and his colleagues 
convinced Burns to put up a defense, surely motivated in part by the desire to 
keep him from returning to Virginia (after all, as my research has shown, his 
chances were better than he might have thought). But the lawyers and activists 
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also knew that the Burns case presented a real political opportunity. Public 
opinion in Massachusetts was increasingly leaning towards a radical version of 
abolition, and the Burns case was a chance to focus attention on the Fugitive 
Slave Law and its horrors. There was more at stake in convincing Burns to put 
up a defense than saving him from slavery: his trial could be a windfall for 
antislavery politics more broadly. 
In this the lawyers and activists were also right. After all, it was the Burns 
trial and the ultimate return of Burns under armed federal guard that converted 
many moderates and fence-sitters to the antislavery position.227 And it was 
Burns’s trial that inspired Thoreau to write “Slavery in Massachusetts” and 
Whitman to write “A Boston Ballad.” These moments of conversion were 
essential to the ultimate political transformation that would give life to the 
Republican Party and result in Lincoln’s election in 1860.228 
But was it ethical for the lawyers to pressure Burns into becoming a 
political talisman when he knew better than any of them the stakes he was 
gambling? In a modern view of the lawyer as zealous advocate, the answer is 
probably not.229 And yet there is a strong argument to be made that every effort 
should have been exhausted to keep Burns free and that the possible broad 
political gains were worth the risk to Burns—provided that Burns could be 
authentically convinced to buy into the strategy. Many present-day theorists 
would give their blessings to an abolitionist lawyer who encouraged his client to 
persist despite the risks to the client as a part of an iterative and collaborative 
strategy.230 The picture is made much more complex, however, when a white 
lawyer exerts his power and privilege to manipulate a man facing exile and 
torture into contributing to his political project. This kind of paternalism and 
opportunism rightly raises questions that cut to the heart of the abolitionist 
movement and the role that lawyers play in today’s social movements.231 
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A related ethical dissonance, also evident in the Burns trial, arises when 
lawyers strategically characterize their work as futile. Remember that the 
conventional wisdom for years was that very few alleged fugitives caught up in 
the process of the Fugitive Slave Law escaped its clutches. This was more than 
just a product of incomplete history. For lawyers and activists at the time, it was 
good politics for the 1850 Law to seem as monstrous as possible. The more 
vicious the Law, the more evil the national political compromise supporting it. 
It would thus be perfectly reasonable as a matter of strategy for a lawyer to help 
free a client and then turn around and argue that the Law was an abomination 
that damned every fugitive slave in its grasp.232 
There is nothing inherently inconsistent about this position, of course. 
Rhetoric and results need not coincide neatly. Still, the dissonance between 
rhetoric and results could create subtle crosscurrents. A savvy advocate looking 
at the Burns case would see just how much political hay there was to be made 
from a losing case. Would this ever cause a lawyer to throw his case? Almost 
certainly not, but a good resistance lawyer would prepare to make the most of 
whatever outcome occurred. When each case is an opportunity to challenge 
slavery in public, and when the broader political project is paramount, then 
individual outcomes and individual humans matter incrementally less. 
Opinions will differ on the “right” ethical position for Burns’s lawyers to 
take. Rather than attempt to resolve those issues, I propose that recognizing and 
considering this ethical problem is an important element of any manifestation of 
resistance lawyering. When a lawyer acts to undermine and challenge a legal 
regime that she fundamentally opposes, powerful questions arise. How much and 
which laws does that lawyer accept as legitimate? What is the lawyer’s 
relationship to her client? What is the lawyer’s relationship to the larger political 
movement that she is participating in? Lawyers resisting the Fugitive Slave Law 
of 1850 confronted these challenges day by day in a way that framed and 
contextualized their practice. 
Resistance to the law in the courtroom meant bringing a clear politics to the 
practice of law. It meant confronting ethical challenges and possible cross-
purposes and striving to resolve and make sense of them. It meant, in short, a 
self-aware and self-critical politics advanced through a daily legal practice 
coordinated with broader social and political movements. In this complexity, it 
becomes clearer why lawyers were more successful in resisting the 1850 Law 
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than previously thought: they were sophisticated participants in a powerful 
political movement, strategically using all the tools that they had. 
III. 
RESISTANCE LAWYERING TODAY 
Two clear threads emerge from these stories of resistance lawyering against 
slavery in the 1850s. First, lawyers were more effective than we remember at 
achieving positive outcomes within a system they abhorred. Their successes 
came from practicing within that system with the goal of resisting it. Abolitionist 
lawyers did not abandon the field to levy high-level attacks on slavery, but rather 
engaged in a detailed, strategic practice of direct representation that sought 
simultaneously to protect their clients and to dismantle the system that threatened 
them. 
Second, these lawyers were not deluded into thinking that their practice 
alone would make the change that they sought. Rather, they understood their 
daily practice against slavery as situated within the broader context of a national 
(and international) social, political, and legal struggle for fundamental change. 
No thoughtful lawyer could imagine that by rescuing a single alleged fugitive 
they could undermine the system of slavery embedded in the fabric of American 
law. And yet every courtroom battle helped to build political power—and every 
alleged fugitive that was freed was one fewer human being consigned to bondage 
for life. 
These two threads turn our attention to the present. In the part that follows 
I will argue that resistance lawyering remains a familiar and even common 
practice of cause lawyers in the American system. In other words, the first thread 
links present practice back to the past. Lawyers still frequently devote their 
practice to daily, detailed, direct representation within systems that they actively 
seek to resist through that practice. 
A. What is Resistance Lawyering Today? 
One might be tempted to suggest that in a robust adversarial system, all 
lawyering is resistance lawyering. For example, when a litigator for a large 
corporation seeks to bog her opponent down in endless discovery, is she not 
using the tools of the system to jockey for settlement position and perhaps avoid 
a trial? Indeed, I have no doubt that most lawyers can think of countless examples 
of “strategic” litigation where a given legal process is used not to reify or justify 
the underlying legal system, but rather to reach a result for a client by making 
that system more complex, opaque, or nonfunctional. 
This kind of opportunistic litigation is different from the resistance 
lawyering that I am describing here. Using a legal process as a tool to seek a 
desired outcome from that process is different from using a legal process as a 
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tool to dismantle that legal process itself.233 In other words, applying the 
hypothetical above, there is a difference between a zealous advocate 
manipulating discovery rules to reach a better outcome for her client and a lawyer 
who opposes the procedural regime underlying the cause of action. 
Take, for example, a comparison between two lawyers asserting a claim 
that their client has not infringed a copyright. I will call the first lawyer the 
“zealous advocate.” When she seeks to gain a litigation advantage over her 
opponent in the discovery process, she does so only insofar as it is strategically 
useful to her goal of winning the case for her client. Now imagine a second 
lawyer: the “resistance lawyer.” The resistance lawyer argues that the system of 
copyright is itself unjust and illegitimate.234 When she manipulates the discovery 
rules to frustrate the application of a copyright, she does so in part to win her 
case for her client, but she is also intentionally using the tools of a process she 
resists in order to undermine, confuse, or destroy that process altogether. 
The zealous advocate accepts the rules of the game and seeks to play within 
them to win. The resistance lawyer sees the game as rigged and tries to destroy 
it from within. Two things make the difference difficult to perceive in practice. 
First, in many instances there may be no practical difference between the actions 
of the zealous advocate and the resistance lawyer. Returning to the example of 
copyright, both lawyers may seek delay and advantage to their client through 
discovery, and in ninety-nine out of one hundred cases they may reach the same 
strategic decision.235 This does not mean that there will not be some tactical 
differences between the zealous advocate and the resistance lawyer. Nor, 
importantly, does it mean that the two will understand or speak publicly about 
their work in the same terms. Still, under the definition that I propose, it will 
usually be difficult to identify resistance lawyering simply by reference to 
tactics. 
The second obfuscating complexity is that the act of resisting within the 
law requires some level of commitment to the validity of law more broadly. Even 
the most radical abolitionist lawyers retained a faith in some abstract idea of law, 
and many retained faith in specific legal processes (state habeas petitions, state 
 
 233. The definition of a legal process is critical here. Legal processes do not exist hermetically 
sealed off from politics, policy, or culture. In some instances—as with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850—
it is easy to identify a specific legal regime as itself unjust and unconscionable. In other cases, the 
alignment may be less clear. Rather than try to impose formal clarity, I want to suggest that because 
resistance lawyering is, under my definition, perspectival, it matters most whether or not the lawyer has 
herself identified the process as unjust and unconscionable. 
 234. For an example of such an argument, see Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto 
(2003), http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.html [https://perma.cc/D88A-6NGW]. 
 235. Note that while a resistance lawyer may have a more complex attitude toward the simple 
ethical mandate to serve her client above all else, this does not mean that she will not also be committed 
to doing her best for her client. Just because this commitment shares space with a commitment to a 
broader systemic challenge does not mean that, where conflicts do not exist, she will somehow not 
choose to serve her client. Moreover, in most instances, anyone who understands themselves as a 
resistance lawyer will be practicing on the side of the law that minimizes these ethical quandaries. 
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supreme courts, and even federal appellate practice). Consequently, even the 
archetypal resistance lawyers did not want to “burn it all down.” It would be a 
mistake, then, to seek resistance lawyers in the present by just looking for the 
most radical lawyers with the most radical critique of “the system.” A public 
defender who is a committed prison abolitionist or an immigration attorney who 
believes in open borders will be comparatively easy to identify (though see the 
first problem above), but the definition that I am advancing requires a more 
nuanced analysis. Resistance lawyering is contextual and procedural. Any 
lawyer who practices within a legal process that she believes to be unjust may 
qualify. As such, to see resistance lawyering in any given case, one must first 
identify the “legal system” that is being resisted with some specificity. 
Isolating the system with specificity is also valuable for surfacing the 
political commitments behind a given lawyer’s practice. Two anti-death penalty 
advocates may disagree on what they name the “system” that they oppose. The 
“moderate” may separate the criminal justice system from capital punishment. 
Thus, she may argue that the criminal justice system is structurally valid (it can 
be “worked clean”) while also believing that the capital punishment system is 
unsalvageable and must be dismantled. Her colleague the “radical” may 
disagree, arguing that the entire system of criminal procedure is a tool of 
racialized oppression and must be dismantled.236 Both are “resistance lawyers” 
under my contextual definition, but in disagreeing about what it is they are 
resisting, they surface clarifying political and strategic differences. These 
differences can be corrosive to political movements if they go unacknowledged 
(and the fights go unfought). By the same token, surfacing and grappling with 
the differences among movement allies with common goals can build richer and 
more effective alliances.237 
This doubles back to the second lesson to be drawn from studying the 
abolitionist resistance lawyers: although they occasionally differed in how they 
defined the systems they sought to undermine,238 they were defined by their 
 
 236. The moderate and the radical have been and remain unsteady allies in the struggle against 
the death penalty in the United States. Radical death penalty abolitionists complain that the “pragmatic 
and conservative” arguments against the death penalty “set aside moral qualms with state-sanctioned 
executions, and focus attention instead on practical problems with the punishment. . . . In other words, 
they appeal to the exiting moral values of those who support harsh retributivism.” BHARAT MALKANI, 
SLAVERY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A STUDY IN ABOLITION 2 (2018). 
 237. These inter-movement disagreements both complicate and catalyze present-day activism 
against the death penalty. See Andrew S. Baer, Let Them Get Their Voices Out: The Death Row 10, 
Radical Abolitionists, and the Anti-Death Penalty Movement in Illinois (1996-2011), 11 J. STUDY OF 
RADICALISM 129, 129–31 (2017). 
 238. For example, a group of hard-liner abolitionists believed that the United States Constitution 
itself was a “covenant with death” and hopelessly entangled with slavery. See WIECEK, supra note 34, 
at 237–39. Lawyers from this camp sought to undermine the deep structures of American legal 
institutions. Others, no less radical on the issue of slavery, believed that the Constitution was not 
irrevocably entangled with slavery and thus focused their efforts on resisting the legal structures that 
were more specifically and explicitly tied to slavery. See, e.g., LYSANDER SPOONER, THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1845). 
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political commitment to dismantling slavery. This meant that the connections 
between their political project and their legal practice were always on the surface. 
This, in turn, meant that abolitionist resistance lawyers were surprisingly self-
aware about the specific systems they were practicing within and against and 
about how that practice connected to the antislavery movements they were 
engaged in.239 This awareness inflected their courtroom strategy as well as the 
ways in which they leveraged the public attention drawn by their trials. 
While many lawyers today could be defined as resistance lawyers with 
respect to some element of the systems that they practice within, the politics of 
that definition are less sharply defined in the present than they were for the 
abolitionist lawyers in this study. Lawyers in the present are, by and large, less 
eager to explicitly use their time in court to build political support or to broadcast 
their resistance as an explicit component of a broader political strategy. 
Resistance in the present is more likely to be covert and less likely to be strident. 
While there may be good reasons for this as a matter of ethics and strategy, there 
are also both public- and private-facing costs. 
With respect to public-facing costs: a lack of political specificity gets in the 
way of possibly fruitful connections between legal practice and broader social 
and political movements. Part of what raises the political salience of a legal 
strategy is the political context that it operates within. Active and engaged allies 
not only help broadcast the actions in court, they also show up at hearings and 
rallies. The greater the clarity of the resistance lawyer, the more opportunities 
she will perceive to weave her practice in with the broader political movement.240 
The private consequence is more amorphous but no less powerful. 
Lawyering can be lonely, dry work even when in service of causes that we feel 
passionately about. It is no secret that lawyers are not, as a group, the happiest 
 
 239. An example of this emerges, once again, from the Anthony Burns case. In that case, 
Commissioner Edward Loring eventually issued the order condemning Burns back to slavery. 
Afterwards, Loring was pilloried in Boston politics. In addition to being a federal commissioner, Loring 
also sat on the state probate court as a judge. After the Burns trial, a number of activists (including a 
number of antislavery lawyers) lobbied in the state legislature to have Loring removed from the bench 
as punishment for his verdict in the Burns case. One of the leading opponents of this punitive movement 
was Burns’s lead attorney, Richard Henry Dana. Loring’s attackers saw the entire edifice of the laws 
supporting slavery as illegitimate and thus were unsympathetic to the argument that Loring was “just 
doing his job.” Dana, on the other hand, argued that Loring should not be punished for his role in the 
system. Yes, he agreed, the 1850 Law was an abomination, but that was not justification for attacking 
the judiciary itself and for punishing judges for the bad politics of their decisions. See VON FRANK, 
supra note 84, at 241. The two sides of this argument represented clear differences between what 
systems were being resisted and what the politics of that resistance was. 
 240. Political clarity need not be public or proclaimed in court to serve this public-facing purpose. 
Indeed, many scholars have explored the many ways that lawyers can collaborate with social and 
political movements in and around their legal practice. See, e.g., Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice 
Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 26–28 (2011) (summarizing 
and evaluating five models of legal practice with and in support of community organizing). My work 
builds on that foundation, arguing that the stories of the abolitionist lawyers suggest that there may be 
more space in the courtroom itself to pursue this work. 
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profession.241 Even if public interest lawyers are generally happier than their 
counterparts in private practice (an often proposed idea that may not be 
supported in fact), they are more susceptible to burnout and “compassion 
fatigue.”242 One explanation that has been put forward for burnout is that the 
competitive, adversarial, and often isolated working environment of public 
interest lawyers, taken together with the enormity of the social problems that 
they face, create an unhealthy work life.243 
Stated another way, lawyers who care about social change risk foundering 
in the isolated practice of law as a means of creating that change. If this is true, 
then one way to mitigate this risk is to construct a picture of one’s legal practice 
that goes beyond the case-by-case, hired-gun mentality.244 A more clearly 
developed set of political commitments and goals could make a lawyer’s daily 
practice feel less futile by construing even drab procedural process as part of a 
broader political context. Moreover, a clearer political analysis also makes it 
more likely that lawyers interested in social change will find common cause with 
activists and broader social and political movements, creating the kind of 
community support that leads to more fulfilling and sustaining work.245 This is 
more than self-help for lawyers, it is politically important: for those who care 
about making sustainable movements for social change, it matters that 
participants in those movements find sustainable ways to engage and 
persevere.246 
 
 241. There is some reason to think that lawyers today are not quite as unhappy as they used to 
be, but it remains true that lawyers are statistically “a depressed, anxious, suicidal, alcoholic group . . . .” 
Daniel S. Bowling, III, Lawyers and Their Elusive Pursuit of Happiness: Does it Matter, 7 DUKE F. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 37, 37 (2015). 
 242. Burnout refers to the disillusionment that can arise when an idealistic lawyer confronts the 
morass and intractability of practice against structural injustices. “Burnout results from a discrepancy 
between expectations and outcomes, or the perceived needs of a task exceeding the perceived resources.” 
Lee Norton et al., Burnout and Compassion Fatigue: What Lawyers Need to Know, 84 UMKC L. REV. 
987, 987 (2016). Compassion fatigue refers to the exhaustion that comes from the “cumulative 
emotional, psychological and physical effects of exposure to the pain, distress or injustice suffered by 
clients.” Id. at 988. It is no surprise that these two problems have “plagued public interest lawyers for 
generations.” Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Buffering Burnout: Preparing the Online Generation for the 
Occupational Hazards of the Legal Profession, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L. J. 147, 157 (2014) 
(citing COMMISSION ON LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, Compassion Fatigue, ABA (July 9, 2014)). 
 243. Norton et al., supra note 242, at 987. 
 244. See also Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like A Public Interest Lawyer: 
Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 467–70 (2010) (connecting 
theoretical engagement with social theory and political commitments to preventing burnout in everyday 
public interest lawyering). 
 245. The writing on burnout and compassion fatigue, as well as research on unhappiness in the 
legal profession more broadly, almost uniformly points towards more cooperative and collaborative 
work models, where lawyers are engaged in collective problem solving and are part of a community 
rather than an atomized group of individual professionals. See Norton et al., supra note 242, at 1001. 
Anodyne as these recommendations may seem, they are linked to a deeper politics that should not be 
dismissed. 
 246. For the purposes of the inward facing concerns, this engagement need not be public or overt. 
It is easy to imagine a lawyer who draws energy and inspiration from anonymous participation in a 
protest or a march without ever making an explicit connection between her practice and her protest. 
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These are not purely speculative musings. Abolitionist lawyers resisting the 
1850 Law were surprisingly active and resilient in the face of dispiriting odds 
and a brutally unjust system. Though their tactics are not unfamiliar in the 
present, they modelled a clarity of political analysis and purpose that magnified 
the power of their work. One need not look too far to find examples of this kind 
of clarity in the present—and by no means do I intend to suggest that any of the 
modern-day resistance lawyers discussed below categorically lack this clarity. 
But where this political clarity is not fully realized, there is an opportunity. It is 
an opportunity to use the process of lawyering to serve and magnify a broader 
political project . . . and it is an opportunity to create a more sustaining and 
powerful model of legal practice. 
In the sections that follow, I outline the ways in which lawyers fighting the 
death penalty, working in criminal defense, and defending immigrants against 
deportation are all practicing in strikingly parallel ways to the resistance lawyers 
who fought against slavery in the courtroom. I conclude with a gentle suggestion 
that, for all these parallels, in each of these cases there is potential political 
energy being squandered by the failure to connect detailed strategic practice and 
broader political movements. 
Before turning to these examples, I feel bound to recognize that I have only 
chosen examples of resistance lawyering from the political left. As I have said 
before, I do not mean to elevate the phrase “resistance lawyer” to any celebratory 
pedestal. Because the definition is contextual, what makes someone a resistance 
lawyer is not her specific politics, but her relationship with the system that she 
practices within. While I do insist that resistance lawyering means a thoughtful 
engagement with one’s politics, I do not insist that it implies any specific 
political commitment apart from a critique of the procedural legal system that a 
lawyer practices within.247 Given this, it might seem all the stranger that I have 
chosen to focus on examples of resistance situated solely (roughly speaking) on 
the political left. I have three reasons for doing this: from small to large, (1) a 
desire to inspire, (2) an aversion to knee-jerk equivalencies, and (3) a broader 
point about critique of the law. 
The first of these reasons is rooted in the nature of the project more broadly. 
Whenever a historian leaves the safety of the past and the archive and seeks to 
bring the historical narrative to bear on the present, the costs can be high.248 For 
me in this case, the reason to bear these costs is that I think there are lessons to 
be drawn from these past lawyers that will be of use to present lawyers—in 
particular to present lawyers who are laboring against systems of racial, social, 
 
 247. Take, for example, the important political differences between moderate and radical 
opponents of the death penalty, or between moderate and radical abolitionists, discussed supra. 
 248. It would be safer and perhaps advisable for me to simply tell the history and leave it at that. 
Recklessly, I refuse. For a summary of the professional perils of presentism and a defense of my now 
serial practice of braving those perils, see Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 413, 482–83 (2017). 
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and economic oppression. In short, I think that there is material here to spark 
optimism in those struggles and, dare I say it, to inspire. Thus, the present 
examples that I draw on are those closest to the group of lawyers who I believe 
are likely to be inspired.249 
My second reason is that while I recognize that the unwritten rules of the 
legal academy require a search for equivalencies across the political spectrum, I 
resist that requirement. When one looks for examples of conservative resistance 
lawyers on the model that I have proposed, fewer examples pop to mind. Take, 
for example, lawyers who oppose abortion and who seek to overturn Roe v. 
Wade. There can be no doubt that these lawyers are deeply committed to the 
substantive cause of outlawing abortion and have linked their practice to the 
political movement to achieve that end.250 By and large, however, these lawyers 
are not engaged in direct service, nor are they practicing within a procedural 
regime that they seek to dismantle. Rather, they are impact litigators arguing 
before a federal judiciary whose legitimacy they generally do not reject, in the 
hopes of changing a substantive doctrine (Roe and its progeny).251 More broadly, 
a survey of the issues taken up by conservative cause lawyers suggests that a) 
most of the struggles that they engage in are against substantive outcomes rather 
than against procedural regimes, and b) most of their work does not fit the model 
of a daily direct service practice.252 
So, without claiming broadly that conservative cause lawyers cannot be 
resistance lawyers, I do assert that most lawyers on the right do not fit into the 
category as neatly as those examples that I do put forward.253 Having made this 
broad observation, it would be a kind of false equivalence to shoehorn in a 
conservative example where it does not fit neatly. 
 
 249. I do not intend to convey that my only audience is these lawyers struggling against inequality 
or that I do not think that the history has anything to say to other readers. Rather, more narrowly, it is an 
explanation for why I have chosen the examples that I have. 
 250. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION 49–50 (2009). 
 251. One could make the argument that the line of cases from Roe to Casey to Hellerstedt defines 
something like a “procedural” framework for addressing restrictions on abortions under the undue 
burden test. Assuming this reading, lawyers who would outlaw abortion but who defend state restrictions 
on abortion under the undue burden test could be construed as resisting the Roe framework. I am happy 
enough to acknowledge this reading as plausible while also noting that this kind of impact work is 
distinct from the direct service triage practice that the examples below share with the abolitionist 
lawyers. 
 252. John P. Heinz, Anthony Paik & Ann Southworth, Lawyers for Conservative Causes: 
Clients, Ideology, and Social Distance, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5 (2003). 
 253. One interesting counterexample to this claim is the radical libertarian criminal defense 
lawyer. Many libertarians today are critics of the criminal justice system and some flirt with the idea of 
prison abolitionism. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 259, 295 (2018) (discussing libertarian critiques to the criminal justice system). When such a 
lawyer chooses to become a public defender, she might be indistinguishable from a leftist colleague who 
agrees with them that the whole system should be dismantled. The trouble is that even though a 
libertarian public defender might disagree on other political issues with her leftist colleague, on this issue 
they actually share a politics. 
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This brings me to my third and broadest reason for choosing the examples 
that I have: legal systems and procedural regimes are, by nature, conservative 
rather than revolutionary. It hardly needs saying that legal process and legal 
practice—precedent, professional training, rules of ethics, etc.—act in a general 
way to preserve stability and slow the process of social change. If legal processes 
are, in the aggregate, inherently conservative toward the status quo distributions 
of power, wealth and privilege, then it should hardly be surprising that when we 
look for lawyers committed to destroying those processes from within, we should 
find more who are critical of the status quo than who defend it. 
Stated more briefly and without celebrating resistance lawyering as heroic: 
lawyers who seek to dismantle legal regimes from within are more likely to 
embrace a critical view of the society upheld by those regimes. Indeed, it is 
precisely this critical view which I propose supplies the latent political power to 
the project of resistance lawyering in the first place. The abolitionist lawyers in 
this study were critics not just of the Fugitive Slave Law, or even of slavery: they 
were critics of the socio-legal order established by and entangled with slavery. 
So too, I propose, are present-day resistance lawyers more likely to be critics of 
the socio-legal order that is supported by and entangled with the ongoing unjust 
distributions of power, wealth, and privilege that they struggle against in court 
day after day. 
B. The Death Penalty 
Lawyers fighting against the death penalty in the United States today 
should find the strategies of abolitionist lawyers familiar. Opponents of the death 
penalty wield delay, procedural obfuscation, and opportunism as powerful 
weapons in their struggle to keep the state from killing those convicted of capital 
crimes.254 Beyond strategy, most lawyers fighting the death penalty also share a 
 
 254. Some may object that this characterization unfairly (or at least unwisely as a matter of 
strategy) depicts lawyers opposing the death penalty as agents of delay rather than justice. I am 
sympathetic to the strategic concern, but I propose two responses to it. First, as a matter of judicial 
opinion, the assumption that lawyers for clients condemned to death will do anything possible to delay 
that outcome is already commanding a majority of the Supreme Court. For proof of this, note the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision to allow the execution of Domineque Ray to go forward in Alabama 
despite the fact that Ray had a very strong Establishment Clause argument that Alabama’s practice of 
allowing a Christian chaplain into the execution chamber but not an imam violated the First Amendment. 
Over Justice Kagan’s strong dissent, the Court justified its decision to ignore the Establishment Clause 
claim by implying that it was simply a delaying tactic. See Dunn v. Ray, 239 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (“Because 
Ray waited until January 28, 2019 to seek relief, we grant the State’s application to vacate the stay 
entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.”); see also Ilya Somin, The 
Supreme Court’s Recent Religious Liberty/Death Penalty Decision is Bad—But Not Quite as Bad as 
Many Think, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2019), https://reason.com/volokh/2019/02/09/the-
supreme-courts-recent-religious-libe [https://perma.cc/K8UE-GZXY]. There are good reasons to 
dispute the Court’s insistence that all late-stage litigation amounts to delay. Lawyers for Ray and others 
understand themselves to be struggling not only for delay but also to preserve the dignity of their clients 
as they face execution. See ACLU AL Comment on Decision to Stay the Execution of Dominique Ray, 
ACLU ALA. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-al-comment-decision-stay-execution-
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relatively clear political mandate: abolition of the death penalty.255 In strategy 
and in politics, the struggle against the death penalty is one of the clearest 
manifestations of the abolitionist model of resistance lawyering in our present 
legal landscape. 
For the most part, my intention here is to highlight these parallels to prove 
that the historical model does have a present analog. Consider a representative 
death penalty case: a client comes to court charged with murder—often of a 
particularly violent and gruesome nature. More often than not that client is poor, 
and frequently she is from a marginalized community. Her first attorney is likely 
to be a public defender or publicly appointed counsel. Sometimes she has an 
excellent lawyer and is clearly guilty. Sometimes she suffers because of the trial 
lawyer’s lack of time256 or lack of skill,257 or the system’s stacked deck.258 
Whatever the reason for the death sentence, most committed opponents of the 
death penalty would argue that the sentence itself is unjust and must be resisted. 
Stepping in after a client has been sentenced to death, the anti-death penalty 
lawyer immediately works to slow down the process and use every tool available 
to save her client’s life.259 A responsible lawyer fighting to keep her client alive 
will exhaust every procedural mechanism in her arsenal, from state and federal 
habeas to actual innocence claims. She will seek clemency from governors and 
presidents, look for loopholes to justify a new trial, and happily throw procedural 
roadblocks in the path of the courts. When the end result of a proceeding is likely 
 
dominique-ray [https://perma.cc/954E-ZQUF] (“So long as the state of Alabama is going to continue to 
have and use the death penalty, it has a Constitutional responsibility to preserve the dignity and equality 
of the people it puts to death.”). 
  These objections notwithstanding, if a majority of the Supreme Court already wrongly 
believes that all death penalty lawyers do is seek delay, it would be silly (and hubristic) of me to worry 
that recognizing the obvious kernel of truth at the heart of the belief poses a real strategic threat. That 
horse, I fear, has left the barn. 
  My second justification for drawing the connection is that I think that there is a latent, 
unclaimed power in claiming the goal of frustrating a system that you despise. Death penalty 
abolitionism is becoming increasingly mainstream. If the tools of the system can be used to end a 
person’s life at the hands of the state, why can’t those tools forthrightly be turned against the state itself—
not only to save lives, but also to build the political power to change the system itself. 
 255. Not all lawyers who represent clients faced with the death penalty oppose the death penalty 
categorically. For example, the Innocence Project cautiously supports a “a moratorium on capital 
punishment while the causes of wrongful convictions are fully identified and remedied.” The Death 
Penalty, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Feb. 10, 2009), https://www.innocenceproject.org/the-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/5K4R-5MWH]. It is possible, of course, to oppose the death penalty as currently 
administered without opposing the penalty more broadly. 
 256. See Public Defenders Speak Up and Push Back, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/public-defenders-speak-up-and-push-back [https://perma.cc/24F4-
FPNX]. 
 257. For a summary of the alarmingly high odds that a person sentenced to death will have had 
inadequate legal representation, see Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation [https://perma.cc/438A-3QHZ]. 
 258. See NAACP Death Penalty Fact Sheet, NAACP fn. i–ii, http://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-
death-penalty-fact-sheet/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/ZX5D-HBYL]. 
 259. See Anthony Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty 
Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 325, 326 (1996). 
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to be the death of her client, anything she can do to forestall that end is valuable. 
And then, after creating as much delay as possible, the lawyer will feel no shame 
in filing a claim under the Eighth Amendment that the delay itself has constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment.260 
The purpose of all of this is not difficult to tease out: the duty of a lawyer 
fighting the death penalty is to keep her client alive for as long as possible. If the 
machinery of state-sponsored death cannot be outlawed, it must be stopped by 
grinding the wheels of the machine to an expensive and long-drawn-out halt. For 
most opponents of the death penalty, the ultimate penalty itself is illegitimate 
and therefore any legal tactic that would prevent it is fair game. 
Without wading too deep into the grasses of a complicated field, it does not 
require much creativity to see parallels between the strategies employed by 
lawyers working for the abolition of slavery and the strategies employed by 
lawyers working for the abolition of the death penalty. In both cases, the stakes 
of the work are almost as high as they can be: life and liberty. In both cases, 
nearly every legal tactic is on the table because the threatened endpoint of the 
legal process (remanding the alleged fugitive or killing the accused) is the target 
of opposition.261 As a result, for most lawyers who commit their careers to it, 
lawyering against the death penalty is a clear example of modern-day resistance 
lawyering. 
But if the tactics in the courtroom are familiar, there are subtle differences 
in the present-day politics of those tactics. Like abolitionists in the 1850s, 
opponents of the death penalty disagree sharply in the extent to which they indict 
the legal system with illegitimacy. The most radical opponents see the death 
penalty as a proxy for a broadly broken criminal justice system that creates and 
perpetuates deep racial inequalities.262 More moderate opponents are willing to 
draw lines between the death penalty (“death is different”) and the broader 
problems with the criminal justice system.263 In themselves, these political 
 
 260. In a string of death penalty cases, Justice Breyer has dissented from denials of certiorari that 
allowed the executions to go forward, arguing that “the death penalty, as currently administered, suffers 
from unconscionably long delays, arbitrary application, and serious unreliability.” See Jordan v. 
Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567, 2568 (2018) (Breyer, J. dissenting from denial of cert.) (also citing previous 
dissents from denials of cert in Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017), Boyer v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 
1446, 1447 (2016), and Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995)). 
 261. Subject, of course, to the same caveats as were present in the context of lawyering against 
the 1850 Law. Different lawyers opposing the death penalty will define the legal process that they object 
to differently. 
 262. Bryan Stevenson is one of the most well-know and eloquent proponents of the view that the 
death penalty is a symptom of a much deeper disease. See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of 
Guilt, 64 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 12 (July 13, 2017). 
 263. There are many death penalty abolitionists who are not prison abolitionists or even 
vociferous critics of the broader criminal justice system. For an account of the ways in which the two 
problems diverge, making death “different,” see Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, The Death Penalty and 
Mass Incarceration: Convergences and Divergences, 41 AM. J. OF CRIM. LAW 189, 197–204 (2014). 
Another fissure runs between advocates who advocate for a focus on innocence claims and those who 
argue that such a focus does a disservice to the broader project of abolishing the death penalty. See Carol 
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differences are not unfamiliar. What has changed is that the work of the lawyers 
in the courts is more distant from these political differences than was the case in 
the struggle against slavery. 
This is a more complex and nuanced point than I have the space to make 
adequately here, but the rough observation is this: lawyers fighting the death 
penalty fight their battles in court sometimes without developing or advancing a 
clear political analysis of the stakes of those battles. In the present, the idea of a 
lawyer as a zealous advocate is so regnant that a lawyer fighting the death penalty 
in court can easily slip into an instrumentalist pose wherein her task is simply to 
delay or avoid the penalty for her client.264 In such a pose, the lawyer need not 
ask or answer the question of precisely how her work is advancing the broader 
cause of legal change. That question might, in fact, seem irrelevant. The problem 
is not that the lawyer has the wrong politics, but that she has not drawn the 
connection between her practice and the broader political struggle as sharply as 
she could. The problem is not that her advocacy seeks to resist the wrong legal 
system, but rather that she hasn’t identified the system with sufficient clarity to 
leverage her practice within it as part of her broader critique of that system. 
It would be unfair to impute this description of underbaked political 
analysis to all or even most lawyers resisting the death penalty. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that many lawyers are as clear as their 1850s colleagues about 
what systems they are targeting and how their legal work within and against 
those systems serves their movement goals.265 Rather, the point is that this 
political fuzziness is enabled by the structure of the practice in the present. If this 
is right, then the story of resistance lawyering against slavery has two lessons to 
teach today’s lawyers. First, the work that lawyers do in the courtroom creating 
delay and confusion can be a powerful tool for drawing public attention and 
projecting political argument.266 The clearer a lawyer is about the potential 
 
Steiker & Jordan Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attractions and Limitations of the Focus on 
Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 607–24 (2005). 
 264. Anthony Alfieri has charged present-day death penalty abolitionists with surrendering to the 
temptations of “instrumentalism” and thereby sacrificing the moral power of community narrative as a 
tool in both the courtroom and the broader political struggle. See Alfieri, supra note 259, at 330–45. 
Alfieri is primarily concerned with the ways that dominant legal strategies end up silencing the voices 
of the impacted defendants. That concern is cognate to a concern that litigation is inadequately attentive 
to a broader political campaign. 
 265. One example of this is the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, which combines anti-death 
penalty advocacy with a much broader political and cultural campaign to recognize and come to terms 
with the history of racialized violence in the American criminal justice system. The clearest example of 
this is The Legacy Museum and the National Memorial for Peace and Justice, both of which aim to 
create a context in which visitors can encounter and reckon with the history of racial oppression that 
expresses itself in the present criminal justice system. See Museum and Memorial, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE ALA., https://museumandmemorial.eji.org [https://perma.cc/88TL-UP9M]. 
 266. There are, of course, essential differences between the present and the past in terms of the 
public’s attention to what happens in court and thus the possibilities for lawyers who seek to speak to 
the public through their practice. In the absence of television, movies, Facebook, etc., the drama of “real 
life” in the courtroom was much more salient in the public mind in the nineteenth century. Newspapers 
from the 1850s were frequently dominated by reports of what had happened in the courts that day. In 
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connections between her courtroom practice and a broader political project, the 
likelier she will be to seize her practice as a tool when it comes to hand. 
The second lesson from the past is that political clarity can help strengthen 
a thick web of political and social solidarity. Although solidarity can seem like 
a squishy term, authentic solidarity is the very foundation of transformative 
social movements. The lawyers fighting the 1850 Law were deeply personally 
enmeshed in activist communities that opposed slavery. When an alleged 
fugitive was arrested, lawyers were on the scene because they were part of 
powerful grassroots networks that were keeping vigilant. The lawyers’ work 
emerged from and was continuous with the work of these networks. There is no 
question that some of the most interesting radical lawyering that is happening 
today follows this model.267 In the case of lawyers fighting the death penalty, 
however, the work is frequently far removed from this immediate political 
context. It is procedural and legalistic, which is fine, but it is not always taking 
place within a context of collective activism. This remove is partly a product of 
the realities of anti-death penalty lawyering: it is a slow-moving appellate 
practice that usually operates in highly technical doctrinal areas. One 
consequence of a forthright articulation of resistance lawyering might be to push 
against this remove and affirmatively foster a thicker solidarity between lawyers 
and movement actors. The clearer a lawyer can be about her politics, the more 
able she will be to build political community around her work. The model from 
the past may be a tool to push back against atomized, individual, instrumental 
practice and to find ways to make that same work part of a robust system of 
collective political action. 
C. Criminal Defense 
Criminal defense lawyers practicing in the contemporary context of mass 
incarceration frequently find themselves using the tools of a hostile system both 
to achieve results for their clients and to challenge the system itself. Although 
the politics of what resistance means in the context of criminal defense can be 
complex, there is value in considering what present-day defense lawyers might 
learn from the abolitionist lawyers in this study. 
As with all the cases discussed to this point, what it means to be a resistance 
lawyer in the area of criminal defense is contextual. A threshold requirement for 
resistance lawyering is that the lawyer uses the tools of a system in order to 
oppose or dismantle that system. For many, perhaps most, criminal defense 
 
other words, a “normal” trial was much more of a public spectacle then than it is today. That said, these 
differences can be overstated. Today, it takes very little for a piece of news to spiral out to a huge 
audience and be seen by millions of people. Although the daily procedures of courts may not always be 
front-page news anymore, one need only look to the life of the OJ Simpson trial in our popular culture 
to see how powerful what happens in court could be. 
 267. See generally Jim Freeman, Supporting Social Movements: A Brief Guide for Lawyers and 
Law Students, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191 (2015) (gathering and describing a wide array 
of present and historical examples of lawyers working in partnership with grassroots social movements). 
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lawyers, the criminal justice system itself is not the target institution. For these 
lawyers, the criminal justice system is not an entirely lost cause. Like the 
abolitionist lawyers who retained their faith in a broader conception of law and 
justice, this subset of lawyers retains a faith in the promise of a functional system 
of criminal justice. For some, that system is a vehicle for adjudication and justice 
that can be “worked clean” by vigorous, zealous advocacy on behalf of 
defendants.268 For others, the critique is more radical and their faith in the system 
is linked to a more revolutionary possibility of a criminal justice system 
fundamentally reconfigured—though still with the structural roots of the system 
we have today.269 
For criminal defense lawyers who retain faith that the criminal justice 
system can be legitimate, there are any number of ways that they might still be 
construed as (and construe themselves as) resistance lawyers. Within the 
confines of criminal procedure are hundreds of strands of procedural processes 
that one might oppose in a limited way. Opponents of life without parole, or three 
strikes rules, or mandatory minimums could condemn the sentencing regimes 
that lead to those results without rejecting the idea of sentencing altogether. The 
lawyers who work within those sentencing regimes while opposing them and 
hoping to frustrate them clearly fit the contextual model of resistance lawyers. 
Likewise, lawyers may oppose state procedural rules requiring that some 
juveniles be tried as adults and seek to undermine and frustrate those rules while 
practicing within their ambit.270 To the extent that these lawyers resist what they 
 
 268. One familiar logic behind this view is that the lack of funding for adequate public defense 
poses a threat to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Eve Primus argues that “[t]he lack of 
funding, excessive caseloads, minimal training, lack of independence, and failure of oversight make it 
impossible for defense attorneys to do their jobs. The result is a breakdown in the adversarial system 
that results in wrongful convictions and undermines the legitimacy and fairness of the system.” Eve 
Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defence, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL 
AND TRIAL PROCESS 121, 128 (Erik Luna ed. 2017). Primus’ argument presupposes that legitimacy 
could flow from a robust and well-funded adversarial system. 
 269. For an example of a radical faith in the possibility of a criminal justice system, see Jocelyn 
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
1609 (2017). Simonson is an unstinting critic of the current state of the criminal justice system, calling 
it undemocratic and “an unequal, racialized system of justice.” Id. at 1610. She is even a critic of 
proposals for more public participation in the system through deliberation and consensus. Instead, 
Simonson champions “bottom-up” forms of participation in the system, including resistance and 
contestation of the existing system. Id. at 1622. In other words, Simonson invites foundational 
challenges to the status quo operation of the criminal justice system from the grassroots. This invitation, 
however, is not to burn the whole thing down, but rather a suggestion for how to achieve a radical 
promise latent in the system itself. If, as she argues, collective resistance can help create “democratic 
criminal justice,” then the criminal justice system itself retains the promise of legitimacy. Id. at 1609. It 
is worth noting that Simonson may be moving away from this radical faith to something more 
destabilizing. But see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 299 (2019) (arguing for the importance of keeping criminal legal institutions open 
to engagement with “a set of beliefs in the need for decarceration and even abolition held by subsets of 
the public that have for too long been excluded from public discourse”). 
 270. Perhaps the most famous example of this kind of resistance lawyering is Bryan Stevenson’s 
story of the time that he made a motion in court to try his juvenile client not just as any adult, but as a 
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see as unjust regimes both with the procedures of those regimes and by reference 
to a broader view of legal legitimacy rooted in the promise of a just criminal 
justice system, they are resistance lawyers under the definition that I put forward 
above. As such, many, if not most, public defenders will likely fit into the 
category in some context. 
Stipulating that there are many forms of resistance that accept the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, there is another more thoroughgoing 
form of criminal defense resistance lawyer. Some defense lawyers question the 
foundational legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.271 These lawyers 
are the abolitionists in favor of “[a]bandoning carceral punishment and punitive 
policing” altogether.272 Lawyers who hold these views question not only the 
legitimacy of specific procedural mechanisms within the criminal justice system, 
but the very purpose and structure of the system. Lawyers with this politics 
practicing as criminal defense lawyers will always be engaging strategies of 
resistance because they are using the tools of a system that they consider 
illegitimate to try to tear that system down. 
The first important observation of the present in light of the past is that in 
the world of criminal defense there are resistance lawyers of many stripes. The 
array of tools that criminal defense lawyers use to keep their clients out of prison 
is broad. These sometimes include delay and often include engaging in 
procedural legerdemain and muddling. As was true in the context of slavery, 
these strategies can be understood both as the product of zealous advocacy and 
sometimes as the product of a more explicit political project aimed at an unjust 
procedural regime. While it may be difficult to distinguish between the zealous 
advocate and the resistance lawyer in individual cases, there can be little doubt 
that not all criminal defense lawyers are “simply” zealous advocates. 
Stipulating that many criminal defense lawyers are to some extent 
resistance lawyers, the next question is what lessons there are to be learned from 
the abolitionist lawyers in this study. First, consider the confluence of hundreds 
or thousands273 of resistance lawyers on the one hand and the growing salience 
 
seventy-five-year-old white corporate executive. See Pete Brook, In Conversation with Bryan 
Stevenson, MEDIUM (Nov. 12, 2014), https://medium.com/@brookpete/in-conversation-with-bryan-
stevenson-f366c00701d2 [https://perma.cc/7XE6-M3V6]. This is an archetypal instance of resistance 
lawyering where Stevenson uses the system’s own mechanisms to critique the system’s internal logic, 
both for the audience in the courtroom and the audience of public opinion beyond. 
 271. See About, ABOLITIONIST L. CTR., https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/74B2-FNJ8]. In a somewhat different context, Benjamin Levin draws a distinction 
between critics of the current state of “over” incarceration who argue that we are imprisoning too many 
people and critics of “mass” incarceration who argue that the very idea of prison may be the problem. 
See Levin, supra note 253 at 308–18. 
 272. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1160 
(2015). 
 273. In 2007, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that there were 4321 full-time public 
defenders employed by states across the United States. See LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., 
SPECIAL REPORT: CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Sept. 2010), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZUP-NWNZ]. 
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of the movement against mass incarceration on the other. The struggle against 
expanded and overwhelming incarceration in the United States has flowered into 
one of the most powerful political and social movements of our time. 
Everywhere you look, lawyers are playing important roles in that movement—
some of them current or former criminal defense lawyers. Puzzlingly, however, 
the thousands of cases that lawyers fight within the criminal justice system every 
day are not front and center in the movement.274 By and large, the daily defense 
of accused people is not a primary source of political energy or a focus of public 
attention. 
This is a complex observation, and there are several possible reasons why 
it might be true.275 But without overstating the case, one of these reasons may be 
that resistance lawyers in the defense bar have not maximized the potential 
political power of their daily practice. One reason for this is that many criminal 
defense lawyers are simply too busy to have articulated the kind of clear political 
analysis of their work that would facilitate connections between daily practice 
and politics. In my (admittedly informal) survey of a number of criminal defense 
lawyers, I asked a series of questions that have yielded revealing answers. First, 
I asked whether the system was functional or broken. Nearly everyone I spoke 
to answered “broken.” The next question is: can it be fixed by tinkering or do we 
need to tear it down? Most (but fewer) respondents say “tear it down.” From this 
beginning, you would think that most defense lawyers are abolitionists dedicated 
to undermining the criminal justice system as a whole. And yet, upon further 
questioning, I have not found that level of political unity. When asked whether 
“tear it down” meant abolishing police or abolishing prison, many I spoke with 
demurred. The system is deeply flawed, the argument goes, but tearing it down 
all the way goes too far. In conversation after conversation, I found myself 
pressing, trying to understand which systems these lawyers opposed and which 
they retained faith in. The answers were always slightly different276 and always 
fascinating and thoughtful. What struck me most, however, was that most of 
 
 274. In saying that the cases are not front and center I am saying neither that cases are never at 
the center nor that public defenders themselves are not front and center. In fact, taking New York City 
as an example, there are powerful recent examples of public defenders banding together to resist city 
and state policies. Defenders from organizations across the city led a movement to restore power to the 
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn during a period of extreme cold. They also banded together 
to challenge the Manhattan District Attorney’s restrictive policy on pre-indictment discovery. See 
Renate Lunn, Electrifying Results of Defenders Uniting, NAT’L ASS’N PUB. DEFENSE (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.publicdefenders.us/blog_home.asp?display=746 [https://perma.cc/HPF5-H6S7]. 
 275. A few examples: most cases end in plea bargains which are not, by their nature, ideal 
vehicles for oppositional political rhetoric; public defenders are repeat players with both prosecutors and 
criminal court judges and it would be bad for their clients in future cases if they insisted on too much 
public attention; we live in a world where the day in and day out matters of court are less captivating 
than they were in the nineteenth century; etc. 
 276. For example, some would abolish plea bargaining altogether; others thought it would be 
valuable if the power in the relationship were better distributed. Some would eliminate all misdemeanor 
charges for possession of marijuana; others advocated reforms in how drugs and drug offenses were 
policed and prosecuted. 
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these lawyers did not think of these questions as urgent or directly relevant to 
their daily practice. These kinds of reflections were a luxury. 
Let me be clear that I do not mean this as a criticism or an indictment—
criminal defense lawyers are already unconscionably overburdened.277 Rather, 
these conversations highlighted the extent to which criminal defense lawyers 
either did not see their daily practice as directly engaged in a political struggle 
or did not see that struggle as immediately relevant to their work. For most of 
these lawyers, their primary and overriding commitment was to their client. The 
first priority in every case was to keep their client out of prison or at least to 
minimize their client’s sentence. On its face, there is nothing wrong with this. 
Indeed, it is consistent with the orthodoxy of zealous advocacy that all lawyers 
are trained in, and it is unquestionably responsive to the needs of the individual 
facing punishment. Under this view of the lawyer’s role, however, the politics 
that have brought the lawyer to that practice are not only unnecessary to explore 
but may pose ethical problems. 
The trouble is that the lawyers I was speaking to were not mere zealous 
advocates; they were almost all resistance lawyers of some stripe. They did not 
come to their work with only a simple desire to win cases for their clients—they 
came with critiques of the system they were practicing in and with aspirations 
about what that practice might accomplish. The story of the abolitionist lawyers 
in this study shows how powerful a daily legal practice infused with this kind of 
political critique can be, both inside and outside court. 
This is the source of my gentle proposal that more and deeper political 
analysis could be a tool for magnifying the impact of criminal defense lawyers’ 
daily practice. The clearer that lawyers with political commitments are about 
their politics, the more potential there is for them to find ways to link their 
practice to those politics. Precisely how those links will work in practice is 
beyond the scope of this project. Let me instead propose three possible ways that 
this clarity might change the practice and power of these resistance lawyers. 
First, and most concretely, are a set of courtroom strategies that might 
subtly change. One example could be as simple as the language that a lawyer 
uses to describe her client—e.g., person instead of felon. Another example might 
occur in the many forked choices of trial advocacy. Take, for example, a lawyer 
who believes that the practice of trying juveniles as adults is systemically unjust. 
When she attends an arraignment for a juvenile client, of course she will argue 
that her client should not be tried as an adult and of course she will employ 
whatever strategies she has at hand to avoid that result. These might include 
trying to avoid judges more inclined to try juveniles as adults, pleading to 
charges that do not invoke the procedure, etc. Beyond fighting these instances 
one by one, however, a lawyer with a clear and developed critique of the practice 
 
 277. See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93 DEN. L REV. 
389, 392 (2018). 
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of trying juveniles as adults is more likely to also work on systemic responses to 
the problem. These might include advocating to keep police out of schools, 
advocating for restorative justice programs for young people, or creating internal 
office protocols to ensure that clients at risk of these charges get whatever 
strategic interventions are required as early as possible. More broadly, she will 
use her bully pulpit in court, such as it is, to attack the practice in the aggregate 
as well as the specific.278 The changes in tactics here may be small, but this kind 
of small shift can be and has been meaningful in the aggregate.279 
Related to these changes inside the courtroom, there may be strategies 
outside the courtroom that would flow from a more forthright embrace of 
resistance lawyering. Once the political project within the courtroom is clear, 
lawyers can draw thicker connections to political movements outside the 
courtroom.280 This means more than lawyers marching in protests or 
participating in social movements. It means drawing the kind of systemic 
linkages that construe the courtroom as a site of political struggle. One example 
of this kind of connection comes from the Bronx Defenders Organizing Project. 
Flowing out of the daily work of the public defenders working at the Bronx 
Defenders, the organizing project has treated that legal practice as a site of 
community organizing and power building. The members of the organization are 
both clients and members of the community, working on projects linked to the 
broader political goals of reforming the oppressive criminal justice infrastructure 
in New York City.281 
This example recalls the intimate connections that existed between the 
organized antislavery movement and the abolitionist lawyers discussed above. 
In our present political context, resistance lawyers have been making more of 
these connections between movement and practice282—and there is room for 
more. 
 
 278. Here, again, the example of Bryan Stevenson’s motion to try his client as a rich white 
corporate executive is instructive. See Brook, supra note 270. 
 279. To take one further example: imagine a lawyer with a choice of two defense strategies. The 
first would be to implicate two other people in the crime and thus to exonerate her client while convicting 
two others. The second would be to present a strong alibi. Assuming that both strategies would be likely 
to succeed, a pure zealous advocate would likely pursue both aggressively without any qualms. A lawyer 
who was also a prison abolitionist, however, might think twice about a strategy that would send two 
other people to prison. While she might feel bound to employ the strategy if it had even a marginally 
higher probability of success for her client, she might seek to first raise the alibi if it was possible to win 
on that score without incriminating others. 
 280. Also, as already noted above, defense attorneys can draw connections to other offices 
through lines of political solidarity. See Renate Lunn, Statement from the Attorneys of Color Caucus of 
the Association of New York Legal Aid Attorneys, NAT’L ASS’N PUB. DEF. (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.publicdefenders.us/blog_home.asp?display=131 [https://perma.cc/B5XR-456Q]. 
 281. The current goals of the project’s campaign are to: “1. Stop the abuse of ‘stop-and-frisk’; 2. 
End discriminatory policing; and 3. Increase NYPD accountability and transparency.” The Bronx 
Defenders Organizing Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/the-
bronx-defenders-organizing-project [https://perma.cc/65ZL-8P3Q]. 
 282. In 2016, a public defender in Las Vegas wore a “Black Lives Matter” pin into court and was 
asked by the judge to remove it. The incident generated press attention and was precisely the kind of 
2019] RESISTANCE LAWYERING 1949 
Finally, the kind of political clarity that I am proposing here might help 
criminal defense lawyers have longer and happier careers doing the work. As I 
noted above, the abolitionist lawyers modeled a resistance lawyering practice 
that connected daily work with solidarity, political movements, and power. With 
the danger of burnout hanging low over the heads of overworked and underpaid 
criminal defense lawyers, there is value in any strategy to make the work more 
sustainable over the long term. Considerable thought has been devoted to the 
problem of burnout in criminal defense work and how to avoid it.283 Without 
questioning or supplanting any of that work, I propose here that to the extent that 
the solidarity and political clarity of reflective resistance lawyering can fight 
against burnout more broadly, it could certainly do the same in the context of 
criminal defense. 
Of course, once a broader political project comes into view, new ethical 
and practical questions arise, mirroring the ones facing the lawyers fighting the 
1850 Law. For instance, if a criminal defense lawyer sees her job both as 
defending her clients and as dismantling the criminal justice system, some 
instances may arise (as they did for the lawyers in the Anthony Burns case) where 
the interests of her client are at odds with the broader project she is committed 
to. A thoughtful resistance lawyer will struggle to resolve these conflicts and will 
likely resort to the conventional ethical commitment to serve her client first. But 
the story of the abolitionist lawyers highlights that these moments of conflict are 
also moments of potential political energy. The more clearly resistance lawyers 
see these moments of possibility, the more promise there is that they can make 
something of them.284 
 
connection between movement and practice that characterized the work of the abolitionist resistance 
lawyers. See David Ferrara, Lawyers Pack Courtroom in Support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ Movement, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/lawyers-
pack-courtroom-in-support-of-black-lives-matter-movement [https://perma.cc/9PWF-2EPP]. 
 283. I am hardly the first to note that criminal defense lawyers risk burnout or to suggest ways of 
conceiving of the practice to militate against that burnout. Charles Ogletree famously argued that in 
order to sustain the work, defense lawyers must look beyond zealous advocacy and find motivation in 
empathy for the client and a sense of heroic combat with “the system.” See Charles Ogletree, Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242–43 
(1993). Abbe Smith reframed Ogletree’s prescription, arguing that for defense lawyers to avoid burnout 
they should commit to a three-pronged approach: “respect for client, pride in craft, and a sense of outrage 
about inequality, injustice, and the routine abuse of power . . . .” Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not 
Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2004). 
 284. To see this clearly, imagine John Jolliffe arguing that his client was not the person that the 
owner alleged, with his proof being that he had the “real” slave here in the courtroom. It is nearly 
impossible, I think, to imagine that given his politics, Jolliffe would have been happy to send another 
human to the “seething hell of American slavery.” See WEISENBURGER, supra note 69, at 124. Rather, 
he would have done everything he could to make the argument while also protecting the other person. 
And all the while railing against an institution that would force such a monstrous choice. 
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D. Immigration 
Lawyers working to protect undocumented residents from deportation 
represent a third category of possible present-day resistance lawyers. I will 
hardly be the first to compare our present immigration policy with the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850.285 In both cases the federal government has created a 
machinery to litigate who may be a resident and citizen and who does not have 
sufficient status to claim state inclusion and protection. Both instances involve 
versions of sub-judicial summary process the scales of which are tipped against 
the vulnerable defendant. In both cases the stakes facing the defendants are 
dramatically high: exile, separation from family, the risk of bodily harm and 
death. 
Given these similarities, it is no surprise that the strategies employed by 
lawyers fighting deportations can look strikingly similar to those employed by 
lawyers fighting the 1850 Law. As with slavery, the value of delay to an 
undocumented immigrant facing deportation is more than just an opportunity to 
put on a better case. It means more time with her family and more safety from 
whatever dangers she may face upon return. Given this, it is not surprising that 
delay is a key weapon in the arsenal of the immigration lawyer.286 Relatedly, 
procedural complexity and involving multiple jurisdictions both serves the 
interest of delay and creates more chances for a good outcome. Immigration 
lawyers use habeas petitions to take cases out of the hands of immigration judges 
just as lawyers for alleged fugitives used habeas petitions to state and federal 
judges in the hopes of muddying the waters about who decides the outcome of a 
case.287 
In fact, the parallels in strategy are sometimes eerily close. In a number of 
recent cases, lawyers representing undocumented clients have sought the help of 
state and municipal law enforcement to protect their clients from federal custody 
and deportation. In one striking recent case a public defender representing an 
undocumented client was in a New York City court for a routine hearing when 
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she learned that ICE agents were waiting outside the courtroom to arrest her 
client. The lawyer convinced the judge to set her client’s bail too high to be met 
so that the client would be taken to Rikers in the custody of the New York police 
and thus out of the reach of ICE.288 This story, and others like it, recall the 
creative efforts of lawyers for Thomas Sims and Margaret Garner who sought to 
use state criminal processes to keep their clients out of the hands of federal 
authorities. 
These striking strategic parallels suggest a robust mode of resistance 
lawyering wherein lawyers oppose the machinery of deportation by seeking to 
frustrate it.289 Immigration lawyers differ as widely as criminal defense lawyers 
with respect to whether and which system of legal procedure they oppose. Some 
lawyers believe in the idea of a functional and just immigration system but 
oppose the particularities of the system that we have.290 Others, like prison 
abolitionists, are more radical. They believe that all restrictions on immigration 
are unjust and advocate for open borders.291 Lawyers from both camps can be 
understood as resistance lawyers in context. 
Given these parallels, it is no surprise that many immigration lawyers fully 
embrace the position of resistance lawyering. There is a long tradition of lawyers 
working with immigrants against deportation who embrace what Sameer Ashar 
has called a “recessive strand” of lawyers who seek to “challenge the [legal] 
superstructure through the support of activist capacity building and the use of 
more critical discursive frames.”292 
At the same time, the gap between movement politics and daily practice 
can still exist for immigration lawyers. Of course, as with the other examples 
here, not all immigration lawyers need be resistance lawyers in any sense. For 
those who do identify that way, there is an ongoing question as to how to connect 
a broader critique of the legal system they practice within to their daily practice 
of keeping their clients from being deported. 
Another informal survey suggests that the reasons for this are familiar. 
Many immigration lawyers that I spoke with had complex feelings about the 
system of immigration courts. On the one hand, they were critical of the ways 
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that immigration judges are not fair fora (no right to an attorney, summary 
process, direct executive control).293 On the other hand, they all had stories about 
immigration judges who were willing to give their clients a fair hearing and were 
quick to note that they often got good outcomes in those courts. Lawyers in this 
complex position do not always understand themselves to be practicing within a 
system that they oppose, and the label of resistance lawyering can sit awkwardly. 
Even so, when pushed, most lawyers in this category do have structural critiques 
of the procedures they practice within. Moreover, most are deeply committed to 
the substantive position that the United States is deporting far too many people. 
This means that a search for political clarity modeled on the abolitionists might 
reveal nodes of political possibility between practice and movement that are 
worth uncovering. 
The case is simpler for radical immigration lawyers who advocate for open 
borders and the abolition of the nation-state. For these lawyers, a forthright 
embrace of resistance lawyering means not only the possibility of a thicker 
connection between practice and politics, but also a richer intra-movement 
conversation. In struggles against injustice, everyone in the struggle can be 
tempted to claim the mantle of most heroic or most radical. Solidarity of political 
purpose is important, but it can also be an impediment to the kind of debates 
among allies that are required to propel mature political movements. Moderate 
“rule of law” abolitionists disagreed with immediatist abolitionists in the 1850s. 
Rule of law opponents of the death penalty disagree with radical abolitionists 
today. So too do rule of law criminal defense attorneys disagree with prison 
abolitionists today, and so too do believers in the possible value of immigration 
courts disagree with supporters of open borders today. These disagreements can 
be confusing and crippling if they go unstated. But if they are aired and explicit, 
then lawyers and movement actors can find strategic common ground upon 
which to build bridges between practice and movement politics. 
E. Conclusions 
It would be easy to overstate the importance of the present lessons from the 
history of resistance lawyering against slavery. Stepping back, then, let me close 
with four points of emphasis. First, slavery was a problem too large to be attacked 
directly by lawyering. Like the enormous and intractable social problems that we 
face today (mass incarceration, racial and economic injustice, deportation), 
slavery could not be sued out of existence. To be effective, lawyering against 
slavery had to be part of a broader political strategy—and the legal cases arising 
out of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 were powerful opportunities to fight the 
institution by proxy in the press and in the hearts and minds of the public. 
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Second, resistance lawyering was the dominant tactic used by abolitionist 
lawyers to fight these proxy battles. Lawyers fighting the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 saw that law as anathema and illegitimate. They resisted the law in 
coordinated partnership with powerful grassroots movements and sought to 
undermine it using the very tools and procedures provided by the law. Through 
delay, procedural obfuscation, and opportunism they both increased the chances 
that their clients would end up free and turned the courtrooms into powerful sites 
of political argument and contestation. 
Third, resistance lawyering as a dynamic, daily set of practices got results 
in court. The lawyers who opposed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 were 
instrumental in helping many clients—more than had previously been thought—
to end their entanglement with the law as free people. Despite the ethical 
conflicts that sometimes flickered at the edges of these cases, resistance 
lawyering was also effective politics, and even (perhaps especially) the losing 
cases became important political flashpoints for organizing and magnifying the 
power of antislavery politics. 
Fourth and most speculatively, while the tactics of resistance lawyering are 
alive and well in many contexts today, and while those tactics are often 
successful in individual cases, the explicit political engagement of the 
abolitionist lawyers should be a lesson and an inspiration for present lawyers. 
The story of the antislavery lawyers shows the power of direct representation as 
a proxy battle in a broader political movement. It shows how a clear political 
analysis and a deep connection with movement activists can transform a triage 
legal practice into a tool in a broader project of social change. 
Those of us committed to social change are not accustomed to telling 
optimistic stories about lawyers and social change, either historically or in the 
present. The law is too often dismal and practice within it can feel like swatting 
mosquitos in a swarm. So too are the courts often dismal, from Dred Scott to 
McCleskey to Shelby County, entrenching status quo inequalities and making 
heroic lawsuits seem like lost causes. But the story of these resistance lawyers is 
an optimistic one. It is a story of lawyers using the courts as a site of political 
contestation and winning—sometimes winning good results for their clients, 
sometimes winning the public argument, and sometimes both.294 This history 
suggests that there is reason to be optimistic about both the power of resistance 
lawyering in the present and the potential of resistance lawyering in the future. 
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